
IN THE BEGINNING GOD CREATED HEAV
AND THE WORD WAS MADE FLESH AND DWELT AMONG US

Conway

REALITY

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REALITY

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cum permissu superiorum

God, the Highest Truth, has created and guides human intellect, not that it may daily oppose new truths to rightly established ones but rather that having eliminated errors which may have crept in, it may build truth upon truth in the same order and structure that exist in reality, the source of truth.

Pius XII

Encyclical Humani Generis

EDITORIAL

IN THIS ISSUE, Reality presents two documents which will be of interest to all Dominicans. The first is the letter of His Paternity, the Most Reverend Father Emmanuel Suarez, on the seven hundredth anniversary of the martydom of St. Peter of Verona, also known as St. Peter Martyr, which is commemorated on April twenty-ninth of this year. The second is the sermon of His Excellency, the Most Reverend Edward C. Daly, O.P., of Des Moines, Iowa, delivered on the occasion of the inauguration of the new theological studium of St. Rose in Dubuque, Iowa.

It is worth noting that these documents describe two Friars Preacher who, each in the short life-span of forty-nine years, have become preeminently "champions of the faith and true lights of the world." St. Peter defended the faith by his preaching against the heretics and set the seal on that preaching by shedding his life's blood in defense of the truths he taught. St. Thomas defended the faith by his writings and by his teachings, bending all his natural talents and supernatural gifts to the penetration and explanation of that truth of God he loved so well.

Father Suarez' letter concerns a saintly preacher. We print this translation of it for the information and inspiration of all members of the Order of Preachers as well as for all our other readers.

Bishop Daly's sermon praises a master among teachers. It was most fitting for the occasion on which it was delivered, the formal opening of a second House of Studies in the province of St. Albert the Great. We reprint it here for the benefit of those who had not the privilege of hearing it. We hope that it may serve as a valuable reference in pointing out th authority of St. Thomas' teaching as well as the high esteem in which he is held by Holy Mother Church speaking through her Popes and her Councils.

LETTER OF THE MOST REVEREND FATHER MASTER GENERAL ON THE SEVENTH CENTENARY OF THE MARTYRDOM OF SAINT PETER OF VERONA

To our beloved sons in Christ, Very Reverend Priors Provincial and Conventual, Masters in Sacred Theology, ex-Provincials, Preachers General, as well as to all Fathers, Brothers, and Sisters of the Order of Preachers.

We, Fr. Emmanuel Suarez,
Professor of Sacred Theology and Master General of the Order of Preachers, Wish health and an increase of faith:

AS THE SEVENTH CENTURY of the glorious martyrdom of Saint Peter of Verona approaches, we earnestly present to you, dear Fathers and Brothers and beloved Sisters, the example of this great defender of the Faith, that zeal for God's glory and hunger for the salvation of souls may always and increasingly flourish in our Order. From its very beginning the Dominican family has never ceased to show forth by this zeal and hunger marvelous examples of heroic fortitude in the exercise of its sacred ministry.

Our gracious Patriarch himself, a few months before he departed for heaven, clothed Peter with the religious habit and, it seems, left his own spirit with him. Peter was born in 1203 at Verona in upper Italy. His parents were members of the Manichean sect. As a child of seven years he clung so firmly to the Christian faith, whose creed he had learned in school, that neither the coaxing nor the threats of his father and his uncle could lead him to deny that God was the Creator of heaven and earth. Later he diligently studied the arts and sciences at the Academy of Bologna. There at the age of eighteen, in order to give himself wholly to the service of God in a religious family, he decided to join the Order of Preachers, whose observance of regular discipline harmonized perfectly with the apostolic and doctrinal ministry.

For thirty years he fought vigorously as a strong athlete in this militia of Christ. Fortified with all the virtues by taming his flesh with fasts and vigils, by contemplating the things of God, by zealously seeking the salvation of souls, with bold intent and burning spirit, he assaulted the terrible foes of the Faith, especially after the Apostolic See entrusted him with the task of carrying on the Holy Inquisition in Milan and its vicinity. By a special gift of grace he refuted the heretics with great acumen, and many of them were converted and did penance. Countless throngs flocked to hear him and he was forced to preach to the people in the wide city squares. He reaped a most fruitful harvest both by teaching the faithful and by hearing their sacramental confessions. As Pope Innocent IV states in his bull of March 25, 1253, "Magnis et Crebris," listing Peter Martyr among the saints, "he was pleasing in his devotion, gentle in his humility, gracious in his kindness, sympathetic in his affection, constant in his patience, outstanding in his charity; and with a mature dignity in all his actions, he attracted others by the agreeableness of his virtues."[1]

God worked signs and miracles in confirmation of his life and preaching as this zealous and indefatigable herald of the Gospel journeyed through many cities, chiefly Cesena, Ravenna, Venice, Mantua, and Milan. He also served as prior in the convents of Picacenza, Asti, and Como. When he lived in Florence he encouraged seven men, remarkable for their sanctity, to establish a regular order under the title of "Servants of the Blessed Virgin Mary" (the Servites). He likewise gathered laymen into a special militia called the Society of St. Mary, in order that they might withstand the armed attacks of the heretics and, if necessary, defend the Faith even to the shedding of their life's blood. At Milan, too, he founded a society of men skilled in the use of arms, called after his death the Society of St. Peter Martyr, whose members would repel with force the might of the heretics if need should arise.

He himself desired to undergo death for the Faith and with repeated prayers begged God for that great favor. God graciously deigned to answer his prayer. On the twenty-ninth day of April, 1252, the heretics murdered him, as he himself had foretold in a public sermon a short time before. When traveling on that fateful day, which was Saturday in Easter Week, from the town of Como to Milan, near a village called Barlassina an impious assassin set upon him. Brutally striking his sacred head with a sword and inflicting many terrible wounds, he slew this great martyr of Christ. Even in his last agony, however, Peter did not cease to be a herald of the Faith for he began to recite the Apostles' Creed, which as a boy he had professed with manly courage.

Thus, dear Brethren, Saint Peter of Verona was the first of the countless multitude of the sons of Our Holy Father Saint Dominic who, unconquered and rejoicing, have met death in testimony to the Faith through the course of seven centuries. It was not without reason, therefore, that with the kind authorization of the Supreme Pontiff, Pope Pius XII, the solemnities of the beatification of the Venerable Martyrs José Diaz Sanjuro and Melchior Garcia Sampedro, and their companions of both the First and Third Order of Preachers, were celebrated last year in the sacred Vatican Basilica on the same day that the first of Dominican martyrs washed his garments in the blood of the Lamb. The cause of martyrdom of many of our brothers has already been introduced to the Sacred Congregation of Rites and the cause of many others could be introduced. Yet in these our own days there are not a few brothers and sisters of the Order of Preachers who in various countries endure persecution for the sake of Christ, suffer in prisons, and undergo death. We wish these to know that we suffer with them as a father in their pains and hardships, desiring the while to bolster their spirit that they may always remain firm in professing the Faith, rejoicing because they are counted worthy to suffer insult for the name of Jesus. Their example ought to be a great incentive to all the members of our Order and to all the faithful throughout the world to fight manfully, lest the hatred of wicked men for God and Church of Christ bring forth greater evils because of a fear of the tribulations with which the wicked afflict good men.

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[1] *Bullarium Ordinis Praedicatorum* (Rome, 1729), Tom. I, n. 297, p. 228.

In this regard it is profitable to recall certain words from the Apostolic letter by which Innocent IV on May 15, 1252, a few days after the martyrdom of Saint Peter and his companion, sought to console our brothers assembled at Bologna in General Chapter:

"This event ought not to disturb you, as if some unmixed evil had befallen you. Rather from this trial you can gain much, especially now when the times are full of danger, chiefly because the Lord God seems to have brought forth from among you faithful testimonies of irresistible light in proclaiming His truth, which the increasing opposition of brigands assails. Oh how great the strength of the Christian Faith! Oh how much confident authority is brought to ministers preaching the Gospel by that great virtue by which, through the consummate courage of these men, testimony to the Catholic truth has so brilliantly shone forth! Moreover, my sons, no one can accuse you of exhorting others to bear in their bodies that which is still wanting in the sufferings of Christ, while you yourselves lack the desire to suffer for the truth which you have learned from the Lord and which you preach. Instead, we know that your entire body has suffered in this martyrdom of your brother-members, who now enjoy true life more intimately in our Supreme Head to whom they are united by actual presence. Toward that true life an equally ardent desire spurs you on after them through the wearying journey of this present exile. Hence, for the remission of your sins and an increase of your merits, we urge upon you the example not only of the Fathers who have gone before you but also that of the blessed brothers mentioned above, who have left behind lessons of persevering patience to be taken to heart in the building-up of the Body of Christ, which many oppose in these evil days. We ask you, advise you, and earnestly exhort you to furnish by your faith the virtue by which the Word of God becomes known without hindrance and quickly spreads. May you, out of ardent desire for the divinely-promised reward, continue indefatigably in the field of your present labor both against the treacherous detractors of the Gospel, who unceasingly corrupt the unspoiled mass of the faithful by the leaven of heretical depravity, and against those mischievous little foxes who are content to destroy with furtive bites the vineyard of the Lord. All the while cease not to carry forward manfully the affairs of the Catholic Faith, that by reason of your solicitude and by your praiseworthy ministry the Church of God . . . may be reformed in the beauty of its integrity, and that by your labor your merits may be increased in the present life and a more abundant reward of glory may be prepared for you in the next.[2]

It has pleased us, most beloved Brothers and Sisters, to relate these things to you briefly, being certain that whatever is done by way of writings, words, and triduas in each convent of our Order throughout the world in the course of this year, or the year immediately following, to celebrate the seven hundredth anniversary day of the martyrdom of the canonization of the most glorious Saint Peter Martyr will be of very great profit to all members of the Dominican family, especially to those who are younger. May they with generous hearts diligently strive to follow his example and so live holy lives and perform effectively the works of the apostolate.

We wish you good health, and bestowing Our Paternal Blessing upon you with all our heart, We earnestly beg that in your prayers you fervently commend Ourselves and Our Socii to God, to the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, to Our Holy Father Dominic, and to Saint Peter Martyr.

Given at Rome, on the feast of Saint Thomas Aquinas, March 7, 1952.

fr. Emmanuel Suárez, O.P.
Master General

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[2] *Ibid.*, n. 258, pp. 212, 213.

SERMON

By His Excellency
MOST REVEREND EDWARD C. DALY, O.P., S.T.M.
Bishop of Des Moines

on the occasion of
The Solemn Inauguration of the Theological Studium
at St. Rose Priory, Dubuque, Iowa
December 8, 1951

Your Grace: Your Excellencies: Your Paternity: Monsignori: Brethren of the Clergy, Venerable Sisters and Friends:

JUST OVER A HUNDRED YEARS AGO Dubuque's first bishop, the saintly Matthias Loras, a prelate of vision and action, founded the first ecclesiastical seminary and the first college in this state. In the building of it and to some extent in the instruction of the first seminarists Bishop Loras was aided by the tireless and versatile missionary, Father Charles Samuel Mazzuchelli, an Italian Dominican. That was in the year 1839[1] At the same time Bishop Loras established a tradition of Catholic education and of sound ecclesiastical study and clerical training, which his successors have nurtured and kept vigorous and sacrosanct to this very day.

Now, in response to the invitation of our gracious metropolitan, Archbishop Rohlman, the Dominicans of the province of Saint Albert the Great, successors of Father Mazzuchelli's province of Saint Charles, have returned to Dubuque; and today, on the feast of the Immaculate Conception of our Blessed Lady Mary, the Mother of God, they are solemnly inaugurating this their house of theological studies in which, together with the students of their own order, seminarists of the ecclesiastical province of Dubuque and others will study in divinity so that "filled with spiritual wisdom and understanding"[2] they may receive priestly power and, with the faithful committed to their care, "hold the truth in charity and grow in all things into him who is the head, Christ."[3]

The Dominicans are come here mindful that in the apostolic charter said to have been granted to their founder, Saint Dominic Guzman, in

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[1] Hoffman: *The Story of Loras College,* (Dubuque, 1931), pp. 17-34: and, *Centennial History the Archdiocese of Dubuque,* (Dubuque, 1938), pp. 561 ff.

[2] Colos. 1:9.

[3] Ephes. 4:15.

1216, Pope Honorius III gave them a commission as "champions of the faith:"[4] of the faith which consists above and beyond all in speculation inasmuch as it is founded on the First Truth, the purest Truth, the sovereign Truth, the Standard of all truth, the measure of every act of understanding,[5] the end of all our desires and actions;[6] the last end of the entire universe.[7]

As all being comes from the Supreme Being and all good from the Supreme Good, as every intellect is from God, so all truth comes from the First Truth. There is no perfect act of understanding, except the intellect's laying hold on truth.[8] The only palatable food for the mind is the knowledge of truth.[9] The diligent and close study of truth, especially of supernatural truth, manifests the power and greatness of the human mind, and enlarges and ennobles it.[10] The truth of God Himself and all the truth revealed by Him are the object of study in this house of theology, for it is a house of theology which, as Saint Thomas wrote,[11] considers creatures inasmuch as a certain likeness of God is reflected in them, and inasmuch as error about them leads to error about God. And so creatures are regarded from different angles by the teaching of faith and by human philosophy. Human philosophy and physical science consider creatures as they are in themselves; but theology considers them, not in themselves, but inasmuch as they represent the majesty of God, and are in one way or another directed to God . . . Further, the two systems do not observe the same order of procedure. In philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and from them leads on to the knowledge of God, the first study is of creatures and the last of God; but in theology which studies creatures only in their relation to God, the study is first of God and afterwards of creatures; and this is a more perfect view, and more like to the knowledge of God, Who, knowing Himself, thence discerns other beings. Hence, in the words of Saint Thomas in another place,[12] sacred doctrine or theology is especially called wisdom, and is wisdom above all human wisdom, not merely in any one order, but absolutely.

Here professor and student alike are called upon to stake their lives upon the truth "in simplicity and godly sincerity, not in carnal wisdom but in the grace of God."[13] For it is written in the Book of Wisdom: "Think of God in goodness and seek him in simplicity of heart . . . He sheweth Himself to them that have faith in Him . . . For Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul . . ."[14]

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[4] *Constitutiones*, S.O.P., (Romae, 1932), No. 1, Para. 2.

[5] St. Thomas, *Contra Gentes*, I, 60-62.

[6] *Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 4 a. 2 ad 3.

[7] *Contra Gen.* I, 1.

[8] St. Thomas, *De Veritate (Quaest. Disput.*, vol. I, Turin: Marietti, 1949), q. 9, a. 1.

[9] Lactantius, *De Falsa Religione* 1, 1.

[10] Pius XII, Letter, (12 April, 1945).

[11] *Contra Gen.* II, 4.

[12] *Summa Theol.* I, q. 1, a. 6.

[13] 2 Cor. 1:12.

Here therefore sacred theology will be studied and taught and learned under the leadership of Brother Thomas of Aquino who was canonized for the heroic sanctity of his life forty-nine years after he died. He died at the age of forty-nine years, in 1274. Time and time again his method, doctrine, and principles have been canonized by successive Roman Pontiffs, beginning with the day when Pope Alexander IV wrote to the Chancellor of the University of Paris to recommend Brother Thomas of Aquino for the license to teach. His Holiness wrote in unconditional praise and, as it seems, in a spirit of prophecy.[15] In our own century Pope Benedict XV promulgated a unique consecration of the method, doctrine, and principles of the Angelic Doctor in the Code of the Canon Law;[16] Pope Pius XI ratified that consecration in His Great Charter of ecclesiastical studies.[17] And only last year, when he wrote of the intellectual errors of this tragic era of history, our own glorious reigning Pope Pius XII, truly great even among the great Roman Pontiffs, reiterated the command of the Code of Canon Law: "Since, as we well know from the experience of centuries, the method of Aquinas is singularly pre-eminent both for teaching students and for bringing truth to light. His doctrine is in harmony with divine revelation, and is most effective both for safeguarding the foundations of the faith, and for reaping, safely and usefully, the fruit of sound progress."[18] And in His allocution to His priests throughout the world, the Holy Father was just as emphatic.[19]

The guide of studies in this theologate is the *Doctor Communis:*[20] "Doctor of all the Church," as the late Holy Father described him,[21] "Doctor of all science, of all knowledge: a characteristic which comes close to divine virtue. In few minds does the reflection of the divine intelligence shine so brightly. We are prompted to ask if God the Creator ever impressed a clearer image of Himself in any other mind. In Saint Thomas' teaching we encounter one of the transcending characteristics of the Sacred Scriptures. In the Holy Bible there is a thought for every circumstance of life; and for every problem a solution. That is characteristic of the Holy Bible because it is the Word of God. Something of that divine characteristic is found in Saint Thomas' classic works: his *Summa contra Gentiles* and his *Summa Theologiae.*" Those two books, continued Pope Pius XI, "sum up the whole universe: heaven and earth.

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[14] Wisd. 1:1-4.

[15] Laurent, *Fontes Vitae S. Thomae Aquin.,* fasc. VI, p. 545.

[16] CIC, 1366, no. 2.

[17] Const. Apost., *Deus Scientiarum Dominus,* (24 May, 1931), art. 29, a-c.; Sac. Con., Seminaries and Universities, *Ordinationes,* (12 June, 1931), art. 18, no. 1.

[18] Encyclical Letter, *Humani Generis,* (12 August, 1950).

[19] Allocution, *Menti Nostrae,* (23 Sept., 1950), nn. 89-91.

[20] Cf. Berthier. S. *Thomas Aquin., Doctor Communis Ecclesiae,* (Romae, 1914).

[21] Pius XI; allocution, *Ecco un'altra ora,* (12 Dec., 1924).

The *Summa Theologiae* is heaven seen from earth; and the *Summa contra Gentiles* is earth viewed from heaven. By these books heaven and earth are brought together. By them without doubt rather than by any other books a sharper light is shed over the wide field of scientific thought. Justly," His Holiness concluded, "is Saint Thomas entitled *Doctor Communis.*"

In his doctrine is not only the answer to the problems of thought and practice, but also immense benefit to the spiritual life of anyone who religiously studies his works. From the storehouse of the *Summae* scribes instructed in the kingdom of heaven can bring forth things new and old.[22]

"Now," in the very words of Pope Leo XIII,[23] "above all the Doctors of the Church towers the figure of Thomas Aquinas, the leader and master of them all, who 'because he had the utmost reverence for the Doctors of antiquity, seems to have inherited in a way the intellect of all.'"[24] Thomas gathered their doctrines together and knitted them into one whole. He disposed them in marvellous order and increased them to such an extent that he is rightly and deservedly considered the pre-eminent guardian and glory of the Catholic Church. His mind was at once docile and penetrating, his memory quick and retentive, the character of his life irreproachable, his devotion to truth single and unqualified, his learning in things human and divine superabundant. He may be compared to the sun, for he warmed the earth with the warmth of his virtues and filled it with the radiance of his teaching. There is no branch of philosophy which he did not treat with as much acumen as thoroughness; his discussion of the laws of reasoning, God and incorporeal substances, man and the rest of the sensible creation, human conduct and the principles governing it, are so exhaustivve that there is nothing essential lacking to his teaching. It embraces a fruitful crop of topics, an appropriate disposition of parts, perfection of method, firmness of principle, cogency of argument, clarity of exposition, propriety of expression, and facility in the explanation of every abstruse point. The Angelic Doctor, moreover, considered philosophical conclusions in the reasons and principles of things, which . . . contain the seeds of almost infinite truths for succeeding masters to cultivate in the appropriate season and bring forth an abundant harvest of fruit. The application of this method of philosophy to the refutation of errors achieved a double success in that it both triumphed unaided over all the errors of preceding ages and provided an arensal of invincible weapons for routing such as are inevitably bound to arise in the future."

That arsenal is as well-equipped today as it was when Pope Leo wrote at the rebirth of scholasticism; for against the false historicism of our day a philosophy and a theology of history can be brought out from the *Summae* to explain the events and the nature of history and their relations to natural and supernatural reality. Against the exaggerations of capitalism Saint Thomas offers the Christian program of justice and charity. Almost seven centuries ago he dealt with the problems which now preoccupy the existentialists: the freedom of the act of faith; the rational preparation of faith; the need of imagination for human knowledge; the distinction of individual being from the universal.

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[22] Cf. Matt. 13:52.

[23] Encyclical letter, *Aeterni Patris,* (4 August, 1879).

[24] Cajetan, *In Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 148, a. 4.

"Again," as Pope Leo further wrote, "beginning by establishing, as is only proper, the distinction between reason and faith, while still linking each other in a bond of friendly harmony, he maintained the legitimate rights of both, and preserved their respective dignities in such a way that human reason soared to the loftiest heights on the wings of Thomas and can scarcely rise any higher, while faith can expect no further or more reliable assistance than it has already received from Thomas."[23] What Pope Leo then wrote of Saint Thomas' contribution to preserving the dignity of human reason is all the more pertinent now, since just a fortnight ago our Holy Father, Pope Pius XII, signalized how science has contributed to strengthen "that demonstration of the existence of God which Christian wisdom recognizes in those philosophical arguments which have been carefully examined throughout the centuries by giants in the world of knowledge and which are already known to you in the presentation of the 'five ways' which the Angelic Doctor offers as a speedy and safe road to lead the mind to God . . . Even though they draw their demonstrative force from the power of human reason, they are, nevertheless, based on concrete realities established by sense and by science." And His Holiness pointed out that the contributions made by science to the two philosophical arguments based on motion and the order of the universe and which constitute the first and fifth "ways" of Saint Thomas, are most notable.[25]

In this theologate Saint Thomas will be followed faithfully and devotedly step by step as an elder brother who is a model not only of learning but also of virtue: "an angel in purity of life and elevation of mind."[26] The chief and distinguished feature of his sanctity is what Saint Paul calls "the word of wisdom":[27] that combination of acquired and infused wisdom which is the fruit of humility, zeal for prayer, and holy love of God.[28] For his teaching does not simply instruct the minds of men, but impels their hearts to the keenest and most zealous love of God. "God's love pours forth and creates goodness in things," as he himself beautifully says;[29] and he never wearies of illustrating all the mysteries of this diffusion of the Divine Goodness. "Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest Good to communicate Itself in the highest manner to the creature: which God has chiefly brought about through the Incarnation."[30] Saint Thomas' genius and the love that burned within him appear nowhere more gloriously than in the office he composed in honor of the Blessed Sacrament. He summed up his lifelong devotion for this ineffable Sacrament when, upon receiving the Viaticum, he said, "I receive Thee, the price of my soul's redemption; for thy love I have studied, watched, and labored."[31]

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[25] Allocution to the Pontifical Academy of Science, (22 Nov., 1951), (N. Y. Times, 23 Nov., 1951) p. 6; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 3.

[26] *Missale S.O.P.*, Praefatio de S. Thoma Aquinate.

[27] 1 Cor. 12:8.

[28] Cf. Grabmann-Ashenbrener; *The Interior Life of S. Thomas Aquinas*, (Bruce, Milwaukee, 1951).

[29] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 20, a. 2.

Pope Leo XIII, in His encyclical letter: *Aeterni Patris,* summed up the judgment of the Roman Pontiffs by quoting Pope Innocent VI: ". . . those who have once grasped the doctrine of Saint Thomas are never found to have deviated far from the path of truth; and anyone impugning it has always been held suspect of error."[32] And Pope Benedict XV warned all teachers of philosophy and sacred theology that "if they deviated so much as a step . . . from Aquinas, they expose themselves to grave risk."[33] So it is not to be wondered that the religious brethren of the Angelic Doctor wrote into the constitutions of their Order: "All masters, bachelors, lectors, and preachers, either in their lectures, disputations, solutions of cases, sermons or writings, must not depart from the sound doctrine of our Angelic Doctor, Saint Thomas; and they shall everywhere strive to teach, preach, and defend it." And "moderators of studies, masters, bachelors, masters of students and of novices, preachers general, lectors, and preachers, must upon their appointment, and after having made the profession of faith (and the oath against the errors of modernism), take oath to hold fast to the doctrine of Saint Thomas . . .": that doctrine, namely, "expressed in his works and in the concordant and commoner opinions which the theologians of his Order hold as stated by Saint Thomas or deduced from his principles."[34] Laws, indeed, which however confining they may seem to an age unable to appreciate the difference between academic freedom and the suicidal license of subversive error, received striking approval from Pope Pius XI,[31] when He made His own the words of Pope Benedict XV:—the Order of Preachers "is to be praised not so much for having raised up Saint Thomas as for never having afterwards swerved even a hair's breadth from his teaching."[35] "The truth" which is Christ's doctrine and which Saint Thomas expounded so well: 'the truth will make you free.'[36] Hold the truth in charity and grow in all things into Him Who is the head, Christ.

The Angelic Doctor wrote this sound and saving principle in his *Summa Theologiae:* "Since the very teaching of the Catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church, we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine or of a Jerome or of any other doctor whomsoever."[37] And notwithstanding the praise and approval heaped upon him by the Church, he did unhesitatingly apply that principle of his to his own teaching.

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[30] *Ibid,* III, q. 1, a. 1.

[31] Pius XI, Encyclical letter, *Studiorum Ducem,* (29 June, 1923).

[32] *Sermo de S Thoma.*

[33] *Angelici Doctoris,* (29 June, 1914).

[34] Jandel, *Constitutiones S.O.P.,* (Paris, 1886) nn. 1130-1132; *Constitutiones S.O.P.,* (Romae, 1932) nn. 667-668.

[35] 8 AAS. 397.

[36] John 8:32.

A requisite of the unity of the Church is the agreement of all the faithful in faith. There must be one who will preserve it in unity, when questions of faith arise. We cannot believe that Christ our Lord, the only one chief Head of the Church, left it without a visible head. We cannot doubt that by the ordinance of Christ one bishop presides over the whole Church. The commission issued to Peter to feed Christ's sheep, to strengthen the brethren, and to use the power of the keys, passes to Peter's successors to the end of the world,[38] so that obedience and subjection are due to Peter's successor, the Roman Pontiff, the Pastor of the Universal Church.[39] To Him Whom Saint Catherine of Siena was wont to call lovingly the "Sweet Christ on Earth," are due reverence and submission as to the infallible guardian, interpreter, and teacher of "the sound instruction of Our Lord Jesus Christ and that doctrine which is according to godliness."[40] Since Christ and His Vicar constitute one only Head of the Church, they who are loyal to Christ's Vicar and with Him hold the truth in charity, shall grow in all things into Him Who is the Head, Christ.[41]

True to the long-established law of their Order, Dominicans will readily and heartily abide by the teaching of the Roman Pontiff not only when there is a question of dogma but of any other declaration by the Roman Pontiff.[42] They will look always to the teaching of the Roman Pontiff "as to a light shining in a dark place until the day dawns and the morning star rises,"[43] for they know full well that with the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff on a matter up till that time in dispute, the matter can no longer be considered a question open to discussion among theologians.[44] As their brethren at Trent stood unflinchingly against the "new theology" of the Protestant Revolution,[45] as their brethren in these days have been in the vanguard against the latest "new theology,"[46] the Dominicans here will be ever alert to "guard the truth and keep free from profane novelties in speech, and the contradictions of so-called knowledge which some have professed and have fallen away from the faith."[47] Rather shall they hold the truth in charity and grow in all things into Him Who is the Head, Christ.[48]

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[37] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 10, a. 12.

[38] Cf. John 21:17, Luke 22:32, Matt. 16:19.

[39] Pius XII, Encyclical Letter; *Mystici Corporis,* (29 June, 1943); *Contra Gen.* IV, 76; *Summa Theol. Suppl.* q. 40, a. 6.

[40] 1 Tim. 6:3.

[41] Pius XII, *Ibid.;* cf. Eph. 4:15.

[42] *Constitutiones S.O.P.* nn. 628.

[43] 2 Peter 1:19.

[44] Pius XII, Encyclical Letter, *Humani Generis,* (12 Aug., 1951).

[45] Cf. Carro; *Los Dominicos y el Concilio de Trento,* (Salamanca, 1943).

[46] Cf. e.g., Parente; *Struttura e Significatio storico-doctrinale del'Encicilica, 'Humani Generis,'* (Euntes docete, Romae, 1951), fasc. 1-2, pp. 30 ff.

On the invitation of His Grace, the Most Reverend Metropolitan of Dubuque, and at the beneplacit of the See of Peter, the Dominicans have founded this Convent of Saint Rose where they are to dedicate themselves to their bounden duty of "assiduous study of sacred truth."[49] It is an ancient and glorious custom of the Dominicans to teach from the chairs of schools of theology and to number among their students not only their own brethren but also students from other orders and from the diocesan clergy.[50] Here that custom is kept today by the seminarists of the ecclesiastical province of Dubuque and of the dioceses of Rockford and Madison. And once again is re-occupied the chair which Father Mazzuchelli vacated in the first seminary of Iowa, over a century ago.

Upon these beginnings presided over by our universally well-beloved Metropolitan, Archbishop Rohlman, sanctified by the holy Sacrifice of the Mass pontificated by His Excellency the Archbishop Coadjutor of Dubuque, attended by the Most Reverend Bishops of Iowa, of Rockford, Madison and Winona, and by His Paternity the Master General of the Order of Preachers with members of his Order's Curia, we dare to hope for the favor and intercession of our Immaculate Lady Mary, the heavenly patroness of our country, whose feast-day this is. Her prayer to the "Father of Lights,[51] to Her divine Son, the Word of Truth, and to the Spirit of Wisdom,"[52] will insure the spiritual and intellectual prosperity of this work for truth. As she gazes upon this chapel now she may well have in her train the Saints of the Province of Dubuque and of the Order of the Friars Preachers; and with humble submission to the judgment of the Apostolic See, in that throng we dare to envision the saintly first Bishop of Dubuque and the Dominican who taught in the first seminary of this State.

May the happy relations which flourish between the Bishop of Toulouse and Canon Guzman, of the diocese of Osma, and which grew even more cordial between the same Bishop Foulque and Friar Dominic of the Preaching Brethren, and which flourished also between Bishop Loras and Father Mazzuchelli, flourish here too as the Most Reverend Ordinaries of the ecclesiastical Province of Dubuque, with their clergy, and the Dominicans of the Province of Saint Albert the Great "go forward, bound close together with bonds of fraternal charity, in union of strength and will, toward the common goal: the good of the Church, personal sanctification, and the sanctification of the faithful."[53]

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[47] 1 Tim. 6:20-21.

[48] Ephes. 4:15.

[49] *Constitutiones S.O.P.*, nn. 4, para. 2.

[50] *Ibid,* nn. 685, 2.

[51] James 1:17.

[52] Isa. 11:2

"Veritatem autem facientes in caritate, crescamus in illo per omnia qui est caput, Christus."[54]

✠Edward C. Daly, O.P.
Bishop of Des Moines

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[53] Pius XII, Allocution, *Menti Nostrae,* (23 Sept. 1950).
[54] Ephes. 4:15.

THE HIDEOUS NOISE OF SATAN

WHEN IT CAME TIME for Mr. Frank Sheed to dedicate his book *Theology and Sanity* he was tempted, he confesses, to dedicate it to "All Who Know Less Theology Than I." He did not, however, for fear that such action would appear flippant; nevertheless he insists that such a dedication, despite its flippancy, would indeed be the truest statement of the case. For admittedly he had no message for those who know more theology than he, only for those who know less.

Now I confess that as I began this article, being desperately in need of confidence, I played with a similar temptation; namely, that my readers would know less about devils than I. A wild and impetuous thought, of course; not only was it flippant but I strongly suspect now that it was also quite inaccurate.

Hence, should you discover as you read on that you do know more than I about fallen angels and their assaults upon men, it would be well perhaps to leave this and get back to your work. If, on the other hand, you find that this article is able to contribute just a bit toward a wiser appreciation of devils and a more healthy awareness of their presence about us, I shall be happy.

I am honestly convinced that the person best suited to write about the devils, about fallen angels, is a person who possesses and uses many of the qualities of the saint: especially, a penetrating supernatural Faith and a deep, more-than-average, Charity. What is more, he must be a person who has, in a certain sense, seen the devil. I mean that he must have the "sense of sin" about which certain modern authors write. I am not such a person.

This "sense of sin" is not a morbidly curious preoccupation with the more ugly and sensational aspects of sins but rather an intellectual and, in a sense, an aesthetic appreciation of sin as it is a spiritual betrayal, a preference coldly voluntary of the human will over the Divine.

Now it is precisely these three characteristics — Faith and Love and Vision — which are so notably absent from our modern world. A narrow-visioned materialism is a most efficient restraint upon the subtle, spiritual impact of belief and love, thwarting them altogether or stifling them to uselessness. And the action of materialism has been so thorough as to destroy in large part even the very notion of sin. Sin is now a disease or a sickness or a pathological condition — but not sin. It is a question not so much denying that moral blackness exists; rather it is a question of calling this blackness white.

One explanation for this moral color-blindness is, I believe, the obvious fact that men generally have abandoned their belief in the existence and operations of Satan and his equally fallen cohorts. Surprisingly or not, we Catholics are not wholly untouched by materialism's sensist attitude. Father Gerald Vann has written recently: "For all our belief in God and His revelation, we may find it hard really to believe in our hearts in the existence of Satan, or at any rate to do more than accept the fact in a theoretical way, without allowing it to affect our practical way of life."[1]

In this article, armed with the facts of Revelation and aware of a more-than-human evil in the world, we are going to do the unheard-of thing of taking Satan seriously. We are going beyond theory. And when you have finished you will perceive more sharply perhaps the devil's dowry to the crisis of human history which we now face.

Of course we have set ourselves within a decidedly theological context — for it was, and is, by the devil that sin and death gain entrance into the world. We deal here with an unmistakably revealed segment of the total Christian picture. That is why a person imbued with the Christian tradition, cognizant of a God-centered reality, prepared by Charity to love a God who created such splendid beings as the angels only to allow certain of them to embrace perpetual wretchedness, and who allows these now to roam the world for new potential wretches — all that the goodness of God may be more manifest and the happiness of the blessed in heaven may be the greater — that person well realizes that intelligent consideration of devils is never absurd.

Saints are such persons. I especially have in mind the Curé of Ars, St. John Vianney. I single him out, not only because he possessed the qualities mentioned above, but for still another reason. You see, the good Curé — saw the devil.

The Curé very likely never read St. Thomas' tract on the angels; he probably never saw the *Summa.* But if he had, and ever mindful of his own bouts with Satan, he would quickly have affirmed that Thomas' doctrine was sound. "I know," he might have observed, "because I had the devil's company thrust on me for some thirty years. You see, the devil and I are, in a sense, comrades."

Indeed, if you read the 114th question in the First Part of the *Summa* in the light of the Curé's experiences you will find that they complement each other: the one supplying the principles, as it were, the other the visible conclusions. Unlike our present unbelieving world, the Curé's faith and personal experience would not tolerate any serious doubt about Satan's existence. So when Thomas asks if men are really attacked by devils, it is easy to imagine John Vianney, with his peasant-like candor and simplicity, turning about and asking, "Now isn't that a foolish question?" And Thomas might reply: "For you, M. Curé, the question is foolish, yes, but only because you believe. Not all men are like you."

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[1] Gerald Vann, O.P., *The High Green Hill* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951), p. 80.

Nor are all men like St. Paul whose statement is sufficient for the angelic doctor to know the fact of the attacks: "Our wrestling," St. Paul writes, "is not against flesh and blood; but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places."[2]

The WHY of the Attacks

Why should devils attack human beings? Isn't all this a bit medieval and over-melodramatic, having puny earth-bound creatures the targets of envious and revengeful assaults from beings far their superiors?

To answer this demands a full realization of the dynamic Christian concept of struggle, merit and reward. Too, it demands a concept which has all of creation on the move back toward its infinite Source. Yet not all of creation wills this return. For there is a segment of it *attempting* to move in quite the opposite direction, a part of reality which with miserable hate is bent on dragging with it away from God's love every other thing. This hatred has a startling history.

Eons before our time a momentous battle took place on the outskirts of heaven — "And the dragon fought and his angels: and they prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven. And that great dragon was cast out, . . . Satan: . . . and he was cast unto the earth, and his angels were thrown down with him."[3]

It was not a light skirmish that the Apocalypse describes, but a pitched battle between pride and the Light. The Proud lost and are now paying an ageless, eternal consequence. Away from the very threshold of consummate glory, they threw themselves into the black place of torments where now, and until God dies, they are perfectly free to embrace the pride which put them there.

In this place of torments, moreover, they remain essentially complete; the pristine vigor of their astounding natures stands fully intact and perpetually at the service of their malice. It is a malice which drives them angrily into the world of men, *especially into the world of men!* Why? Because they cannot face the fact that we puny earth-bounds are in line to receive the very treasure they have abandoned! For this reason, God is not the principal objective of Lucifer's envious attacks of temptation. *We* are.

They hate us, make no mistake about that. Not halfheartedly: angels, even the fallen ones, do nothing halfheartedly. When they love or hate, it's all or nothing — and the devils hate.

The late Father Walter Farrell has put this very graphically:

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[2] Ephes. 6:12.

[3] Apoc. 12:7-9.

> We must see something of the tragedy that saw the light of (the angels') faith extinguished, and utter blackness descend to hide for ever the secrets of God; that turned the flame of that charity into the ashes of hate; that closed for ever the gates of hope and opened the floodgates of despair; for only then can we begin to suspect the consuming rancour that hurls those diabolic powers against all that is good, and with no surcease.[4]

We agreed to keep ourselves aware of the theocentric context of things and within this context all existing beings have a place, even diabolic hatred. All things and *this* are ordered and sustained by a Divine Wisdom which makes all things work for the good of those who love Him. Each cosmic happening — from the noiseless descent of a snowflake to the instantaneous sweep of angelic knowledge — is measured by this Wisdom which is so all-embracing as to be able to bring good out of evil. Consequently, when Divine Wisdom tolerates devils' hatred to erupt into directed assaults on men it is for this, *that good may come of it.* Either the good of punishment or the necessity of a testing, a sifting of the soul "that it may appear whether you love Him." Or again it may afford the opportunity to merit, or give occasions for virtuous action, or for prayer. And in all this the devils find themselves in the disgusting position of actually aiding God do good.

The conflict of intention between God and devils Thomas alludes to when he points out that if devils attack to instigate to sin, then they are not strictly sent. Whereas if their attacks are punitive they are sent, strictly, by God. Nevertheless, the "demons who are sent to punish do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent: for they punish from hatred or envy, whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice."[5]

Yet, no matter what intention prompts the attacks, we've already got our hands quite full what with the world and the flesh dragging at our wills, without bringing the additional burden of devilish malice into the business. Life is hard enough: add devils and the prospect seems all the more unfair and unbalanced. To this Thomas says, no, it does not. If you insist that it does, you forget the unsurpassed excellence of the reward awaiting success: you forget the grace of God: you forget the guardianship of the angels of light.

Of course the struggle is made more intense by their being in it but the reward is that much greater. "To him that shall overcome I will give to sit with Me in my Throne; as also I have overcome and am set down with My Father in His Throne."[6]

How They Go About It

We know now that from their point of view demons attack solely to provoke a spiritual self-betrayal in men's souls. There is a catch, however.

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[4] Walter Farrell, O.P., "The Devil Himself," *Satan* (Bruno de Jesus-Maria, editor; New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952), p. 11.

[5] *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 114, a. 1.

[6] Apoc. 3:21.

To do this they first need to know what the inner dispositions of a man's heart really are. They've got to make sure where a man is weak, so they test him, like a night patrol in Korea tests enemy lines; and then, when gaps appear in the man's spiritual outguards they come in. This testing, moreover, is really one aspect of a very common phenomenon we call *temptation.*

About temptation St. Thomas asks this question: is tempting the unique prerogative of fallen angels or is it a pleasant faculty shared by other intellectual beings? As if it were not enough that *they* have the job, should there be others also capable of the same nefarious work? Thomas answers by explaining that the immediate objective of every tempter is knowledge about the thing tempted.

This knowledge, moreover, can be put to good use or bad; testing with a view to improving a fellow's position, for instance, or hoping to subvert and deceive him. It is in this second way that devils go about their work. Either initially to expose the moral soft spot, or if this is already done, to keep the soft spot unrepaired. For as long as it remains unrepaired it stands as their path of entrance, the superhighway down which all Satan's allurements and enticements speed.

When men tempt — and of course they do — expressly to hurt by alluring to sin, they do so as ministers of Satan, as paid servants in his household of hate. Similarly, the flesh and the world contribute their pittance by being Satan's shining tools.

The late Mr. C. S. Lewis, among other modern authors, has perhaps best caught the scene of these devilish workings. I refer to his famous, thought-provoking *The Screwtape Letters.* Screwtape, as you know, is a rather influential devil (an under-secretary in charge of a department, I believe) who has been sending a series of detailed instructions to his nephew, an underling devil named Wormwood, concerning the hoped-for ruin of a particular human. Screwtape's letters leave little doubt about the extremes to which jealous envy drives demons in their devouring search for souls.

They never give up. If one attack fails they try another and the effort never tires them . . . and it has been going on for centuries.

They work to suppress truth and to replace it with 'jargon.' Valid argument they fear, for it proves that men are thinking. This they despise . . . "It is funny how mortals always picture us as putting things into their minds: in reality our best work is done by keeping things out."[7]

They want to create a sense of stark, brave realism which of course ignores all spiritual verities.

They seek to make religion as shabby, insignificant, and contained, as the man in the last pew of any local church because they quite frankly dislike the view of the Church which *they* have. As Screwtape confesses : "We see the Church spread out through all time and space and rooted in eternity, terrible as an army with banners. That, I confess, is a spectacle which makes our boldest tempters uneasy."[8]

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[7] C. S. Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1943), p. 25.

They gleefully exaggerate petty grievances and aggravate genuine difficulties and when these grow into the monstrous things we call wars, the devils rejoice doubly for the occasion to sow new seeds of impatience, impurity, and despair.

This is a good time to set aside the fictional approach to devils and to look at the testimony of real life. These lessons carry even more impact; I refer to the Curé of Ars.

From the outset of his relations with the Curé – relations lasting over thirty years, remember – Satan seemed to realize that he would be unable to conquer the priest on the side of human weakness; you might say there were no gaps in his spiritual outguards. As Mr. Henri Gheon, writing of the Curé, admits, "there was no success to be hoped for against such a degree of faith, abnegation, and love."[9] Thus Satan had to take other tacks: sowing doubts about his vocation, about the reasonableness of penances, about the value of his work in Ars; but these were minor and almost always disappointments. Satan was reduced finally to the physical, with which he could only hope to frighten the Curé, or prevent his sleep (already very meager), or try his nerves. Proof that the devil even then suspected that the fight for the priest's soul was lost, for "noises and blows, for a spirit, are only a forlorn hope."[10]

Satan was desperate. He began his last-ditch stand against the Curé with everything he could command: gusts of wind, fire, sounds of musical instruments. He gave the impression of being everywhere and nowhere. He swarmed through the small house at Ars like a rat, *and sometimes he was a rat.* Frequently while lying in his curtained bed, the Curé "heard what sounded like a light pattering (like that actually of a rat); the animal approached the bed, clawed the curtains, gnawed at them. M. Vianney got up to frighten him. The noise ceased; there was no sign of a rat. No sooner was he back in bed than it all began again. Armed with a pitchfork he shook the curtains and scraped about the floor. The rate gnawed away all night, and for nights on end, but there was not a toothmark in the curtains."[11]

Lucifer ran the gamut of possibilities for over thirty years. And although he dragged the man around by the heels and whispered repeatedly into his ears, "Vianney! Vianney! Eater of potatoes! We shall have you all right! We've got you!",[12] he could not prevent his becoming a saint . Rather he contributed to his sanctity generously.

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[8] *Ibid.,* p. 15.

[9] Henri Gheon, *The Secret of the Cure D'Ars* (F. J. Sheed translator, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), p. 163.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 164.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 167.

Certain Other Thoughts

I have made the devils out to be very active beings, and if it weren't for the sobering reminder of experience we might be tempted to pin all moral evil on *them*. Father Vann warns that "to turn Satan into a scapegoat (for our sins) is like turning God into a mascot."[13] When men try to saddle the devils with all responsibility for evil in the world they play right into their hands. They are not totally responsible for it, at least not directly. But *indirectly*, yes, they have their dirty paws in every human failing because of a certain victory they won in a place called Eden.

The devil does not force men to sin; he cannot change their wills. But he can suggest; and when men freely follow the suggestions, they freely sin. The fact of human volitional freedom is too well known on earth and in hell to allow us the escape of pointing back at Satan and saying *he* did it.

I said before that St. John Vianney would confirm Thomas' study of the devils but I fear that on this last point he would like very much to disagree. There is no trouble when Thomas states that devils can work prodigious wonders to test souls; the Curé certainly would go along with that. But when Thomas argues that devils once overcome are prevented for a time from further assaults, the good Curé might well remark, "That may be so, but he didn't let me alone for thirty years!"

In reality there is a difference of opinion here; some say that an unsuccessful tempter (as Wormwood proved himself to be) loses all his tempting powers so as to become totally impotent. Others, more moderate, allow only a partial diminution of power. These latter say that a tempter can continue to test others, but not the same man who has successfully resisted him.

This second opinion Thomas prefers, but with this reservation. It is only *for a time* that the defeated devil cannot return to his human antagonist; when that time has elapsed, at the judgment and will of the God-Head, he is allowed to resume his insatiable offensive. Both God's limitless reach of mercy and the devils themselves make this welcome lull possible.

God shows his mercy by taking note of men's weakness, as St. John Chrysostom writes: "The devil does not tempt for just as long as *he* likes, but for as long as God allows: for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness."[14]

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

[13] Gerald Vann, O.P., *The High Green Hill* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951), p. 85.

The devils break off their attacks at times because *they shrink from frequent defeat.* This is, I believe, a truly remarkable fact. It sounds a note of victory which has demons cringing before numerous setbacks at the hands of humans. It presents, moreover, a happy thought to finish on.

What could easily become an excellent field for pessimism and despair and allied emotions can instead become the touchstone of, and a springboard to, great Christian virtues — and ultimately to glory.

Satan quite definitely botched his job with the Curé of Ars; his machinations were even converted into immense good. So perhaps with us. For both we and the Curé have put our trust and find our strength in Him Who said: "Fear not; I have overcome the world."[15]

Mark Sullivan, O.P.

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[14] Quoted by St. Thomas: *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 114, a. 5.

[15] John 16:33.

SACRAMENTAL CAUSALITY

SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY has furnished the historians of dogma with one of their most fertile fields of investigation. The mature development of sacramental dogmas, indeed the very enumeration of the sacraments themselves, was first attained by the twelfth-century theologians. It would be erroneous to conclude from this fact, however, that the sacraments were either not known or were not in existence in the early Church. On the contrary, the sacraments, having been instituted by Jesus Christ, were in use in the very earliest days of Christianity. One facet of this complex problem which has never ceased to attract the attention of theologians is the question of sacramental efficacy.

In the beginning the sacraments were certainly considered to have efficacy for the forgiveness of sins and for the sanctification of souls. The problem of the nature of this efficacy was brought into sharp focus by the Baptismal controversy. The participants in this controversy endeavored to determine whether the efficacy of the sacraments produced its effects independently of the subjective dispositions of the minister and recipient. Among those who favored an affirmative response were Pope St. Stephen I, who waged his battle against the negative stand of St. Cyprian, and St. Augustine, who carried the fight to the Donatists. Though this controversy advanced the development of the doctrine of sacramental causality, it failed to produce a definitive answer to the question of the precise relation between the sacramental rite and the grace produced. It remained for later theologians to determine whether there exists a relation of causality or whether the external rite is a mere external accompaniment of the internal effect.

This problem of the causality of the sacraments took up the attention of the theologians from the twelfth century until the Council of Trent. Although the Council did not use the term "cause" in its definition, the decrees were so worded that since that time no theologian has dared explicitly to express the theory that true causality is not to be attributed to the sacraments. The controversy regarding sacramental causality did not end with the Council of Trent. On the contrary, the decrees of this Council gave impetus to a whole new theological controversy, namely: whether the sacraments are true efficient instrumental causes or merely moral instruments in the production of their effects.

Purpose

Our purpose is, 1) to establish that the true doctrine of St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* is that the sacraments are perfect physical instruments in the production of grace, and 2) to answer the principal difficulties proposed against this theory.

In the commentary on the *Sentences,* we find that after his rejection of occasional causality St. Thomas proposes a doctrine of sacramental causality which seems to be more in conformity with the doctrine of the theologians and the saints.[1]

> And therefore others say that from the sacraments two things are left in the soul. One which is the *sacramentum et res,* such as the character, or, in the sacraments which do not imprint a character, some adornment of the soul; the other (effect) which is the *res tantum,* such as grace. With regard to the first effect the sacraments are in some manner efficient causes; but as regards the second they are causes disposing by a type of disposition which is necessary, unless there be some impediment on the part of the recipient.[2]

In explaining this theory, which is known as the theory of dispositive physical causality, St. Thomas points out that the instrumental action sometimes attains to the ultimate perfecion of the form which the principal agent produces, at other times, however, only to the disposition for the form. In every case, whether it attains to the form or to the disposition, it acts beyond the power which belongs to it according to its own proper nature.

God is the principal cause of justification. He does not require instrumental causes to attain his effects, but, in deference to the nature of man, He has instituted the sacraments as visible instrumental signs of his work. They instrumentally attain to the production of the character in the soul, but, according to the theory of dispositive causality, are only dispositive instruments in the production of the ultimate effect which is grace.[3]

Underlying this theory was the principle that grace was the effect of a creative action of God and consequently could not be the production of any instrumental action. This was the more common opinion of theologians when St. Thomas wrote his commentary on the *Sentences,* and he conformed to it his doctrine of sacramental causality. When he later established the fact that grace, since it is an accident, could not properly be the term of creation, he abandoned the theory of dispositive causality. Furthermore, theologians failed to offer a wholly satisfactory explanation of the "disposition exigent of grace." Their solution was intelligible with regard to the sacraments which imprint a character, but medieval theologians failed to explain the "*aliquis ornatus animae*" of the other sacraments.

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[1] *Super Libros Sententiarum* (ed. Moos, 4 vols., Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-47), IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4.

[2] "Et ideo alii dicunt quod ex sacramentis duo consequuntur in anima. Unum quod est sacramentum et res, sicut character, vel aliquis ornatus animae in sacramentis in quibus non imprimitur character; aliud quod est res tantum, sicut gratia. Respectu ergo primi effectus sunt sacramenta causae aliquo modo efficientes; sed respectu secundi sunt causae disponentes tali dispositione quae est necessitas, nisi sit impedimentum ex parte recipientis." *(Ibid.)*

[3] "Principale agens respectu justificationis Deus est, nec indiget ad hoc aliquibus instrumentis ex parte sua; sed propter congruitatem ex parte hominis justificandi, ut supra dictum est, utitur sacramentis quasi quibusdam instrumentis justificationis. Hujusmodi autem materialibus instrumentis competit aliqua actio ex natura propria, sicut aquae abluere et oleo facere nitidum corpus; sed ulterius, inquantum sunt instrumenta divinae misericordiae justificantis, pertingunt instrumentaliter ad aliquem effectum in ipsa anima, quod primo correspondet sacramentis, sicut est character vel aliquid hujusmodi. Ad ultimum autem effectum quod est gratia, non pertingunt etiam instrumentaliter, nisi *dispositive,* inquantum hoc quod instrumentaliter effective pertingunt, est dispositio, quae est necessitas, quantum in se est, ad gratiae susceptionem." *(Ibid.)*

Although in the *Summa Theologiae* St. Thomas expounded the doctrine of perfect physical causality, which will be established later, some theologians, in an attempt to cite St. Thomas as an authority for their own doctrines, have debated about the true opinion of the Common Doctor regarding sacramental causality.[4] While it is proper to interpret the words of an author according to his other works, sound criticism demands that such an interpretation be made in the light of posterior works and not those of an earlier period. On the strength of this principle, Cajetan[5] draws the following conclusions regarding the teaching of St. Thomas on sacramental causality: 1) St. Thomas expounds the theory of dispositive causality in his commentary on the *Sentences*, not as his own opinion but as the opinion of others and as the more probable opinion; 2) he expounds his own theory of sacramental causality in the *Summa Theologiae* where he describes this causality as that of a perfect physical instrument; 3) grace, properly speaking, is not created.

The first of these conclusions can be established by a consideration of the text of the commentary on the *Sentences*. There St. Thomas expressly stated that this is the opinion of others and is only a more probable opinion.[6] A study of this expression as found in reference to other matters in the same commentary lends weight to this reasoning.[7]

A look at the chronology of the works of St. Thomas reveals that the *Summa Theologiae* represents the mature thought of St. Thomas and hence is to be the criterion for the judgment of his doctrine as found in earlier works. This doctrine of perfect physical causality is at least hinted at in his writings between the composition of the commentary on the *Sentences* and the *Summa Theologiae*, since he makes no mention of a disposition for grace when expressly treating of this causality.[8] In the next section of this article a detailed study will be made of the text of the *Summa* to establish that the doctrine of the perfect physical instrumentality of the sacraments is his manifest teaching in that work.

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[4] Pierre de La Palu, *In III et IV Sententiarum* (Paris: Chevallon, 1517), IV lib., d. 1, q. 1.

J. Capreolus, *Defensiones Theologiae* (ed. Paban-Pegues, Turin: Cattier, 1906), t. VI, dist. 1, 2 and 3, q. 1, a. 1; p. 3.

F. Ferrariensis, *Commentarium in IV Contra Gentiles* (ed. Leonina, Rome: 1930), vol. XV, c. 57.

[5] *Commentarium in Summa Theologiae* (ed. Leonina, vol. XII, *Opera Omnia;* Rome: Typ. Poly. Vat., 1906), III, q. 62, a. 1.

[6] *Loc cit.*

[7] M. Tuyaerts, O.P., "Utrum S. Thomas Causalitatem Sacramentorum Respectu Gratiae Mere Dispositivam Umquam Docuerit," *Angelicum* (Fasc. 2, 1931), VIII, pp. 149-186.

[8] *Summa Contra Gentiles* (Rome: Marietti, 1946; ed. Leonina Manualis), cc. 56 and 78.

As regards the third conclusion of Cajetan, although St. Thomas has never explicitly treated the question of the creation of grace, it can be determined from indirect statements regarding the matter that he never expressly adhered to the doctrine that grace was an effect of creation. In fact, he nearly always avoids the expression "creation of grace"; he never expressly affirms its creation; and, finally, in three places, in response to objections founded on the principle that grace is the effect of creation, he expressly denies that grace is properly said to be created.[9] His reasons will be considered in greater detail as we proceed to the answers of the various objections proposed to his doctrine of sacramental causality as contained in the *Summa.*

Causality of the Sacred Humanity

The causality of the sacraments is intimately connected with the causality of the sacred humanity of Jesus Christ; they are but the particular applications of the universal remedy for sin.[10] St. Thomas writes:

> The sacrament operates to cause grace after the manner of an instrument. There is a double instrument, however: one separated, as a stick; the other conjoined, as a hand. The separated instrument is moved through the conjoined instrument, as the stick by the hand. The principal efficient cause of grace is God himself, to whom the humanity of Christ is compared as the conjoined instrument; the sacrament however as the separated instrument.[11]

As previously indicated, many of those who deny a physical causality to the sacraments also deny such a causality on the part of the sacred humanity. Hence we shall briefly consider St. Thomas' doctrine regarding the causality of the humanity of Christ, the conjoined instrument, before taking up his doctrine on the causality of the sacraments, the separated instruments, since the same type of perfect instrumental causality is attributed to both.

St. Thomas says that the soul of Christ, insofar as it is an instrument hypostatically united to the Word of God, has power to perform all those miracles which were ordained to the end of the Incarnation; he expressly excludes it as an instrument of annihilation and creation.[12]

If St. Thomas was speaking here of the soul of Christ as a moral cause and not a physical instrument, it would not have been necessary to exclude its causality with reference to annihilation and creation. For while these two actions do not admit of a physical instrument,[13] there is no reason why Christ could not have sought as a moral cause the creation of a soul.

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[9] *De Veritate,* q. 27, a. 3 ad 9; *De Potentia,* q. 3, a. 8 ad 3 and 4; *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 110, a. 2 ad 3.

[10] *In IV Sent.,* Prologus.

[11] "Sacramentum operatur ad gratiam causandam per modum instrumenti. Est autem duplex instrumentum: unum quidem separatum, ut baculus; aliud autem conjunctum, ut manus. Per instrumentum autem conjunctum, movetur instrumentum separatum, sicut baculus per manum. Principalis autem causa efficiens gratiae est ipse Deus, ad quem comparatur humanitas Christi sicut instrumentum conjunctum; sacramentum autem sicut instrumentum separatum." (*Summa Theol.,* III, q. 62, a. 5).

[12] *Ibid.,* q. 13, a. 2.

The efficiency of the sacred humanity is undoubtedly seen most clearly in St. Thomas' treatment of the manner in which the effects of the Passion were accomplished.[14] He determines first that the Passion operated meritoriously, secondly as satisfaction, thirdly as a sacrifice, fourthly as a redemption. Since all of these bespeak a moral efficiency, it is very evident when he asks in the sixth article whether the Passion of Christ operated efficiently that he is speaking of physical instrumentality. This evidence is supported by the manner in which he places an objection to this article: it does not seem that one who merits an effect should also operate efficiently to attain it. In his classic reply to this objection, St. Thomas points out that with respect to the Divinity Christ's Passion operated physically, whereas it operated only morally with respect to the will of Christ. Thus a moral cause expects an effect from another, whereas the efficient cause attains the effect itself.[15]

Elsewhere St. Thomas speaks of the death of Christ *in fieri* (the Passion) as accomplishing salvation, but once death had taken place the body was no longer able to act meritoriously, as the soul had been separated from it, though by reason of the hypostatic union it could still act efficiently. He also shows that after the resurrection Christ was not able to act meritoriously because he was no longer in a state which was capable of meriting, i.e., the state of a wayfarer on this earth. Consequently, He was able to act only in an efficient manner.[16] That St. Thomas was speaking of a true physical efficiency, and not merely of the prayer of Christ in which He is the principle cause, becomes evident in the following commentary of the Angelic Doctor:

> Christ is the exemplar of our resurrection insofar as He took flesh and arose in it. Not only this, but he is also the efficient cause, because those things wihch were performed by the humanity of Christ were done not only according to the power of the humanity, but in virtue of the divinity to which it was united. Whence as His touch cured leprosy, insofar as it was the instrument of the divinity, so also the resurrection, not insofar as it is the resurrection of a body, but insofar as it is the resurrection of a body united to the Word of life.[17]

It is not our purpose here to explain the manner in which an animated and conjoined instrument operates to the accomplishment of the effect of the principal agent, but merely to establish the teaching of St. Thomas as regards the *fact* of this perfect physical instrumentality in the attainment of supernatural effects.[18] Hence, though many other texts could be cited, the ones already given suffice to demonstrate the teaching of St. Thomas. In the light of the physical causality of the sacred humanity we are prepared to examine the physical instrumentality of the sacraments in the production of grace.

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[13] *Ibid.*, I, q. 45, a. 5.

[14] *Ibid.*, III, q. 48.

[15] *Ibid.*, III, q. 48, a. 6 ad 3.

[16] *Ibid.*, III, q. 51, a. 6.

[17] "In ea quod Christus accepit carnem, et in ea resurrexit, est exemplar nostrae resurrectionis. Nec solum hoc est, sed et causa efficiens, quia quae humanitate Christi gesta sunt, non solum sunt gesta secundum virtutem humanitatis, sed virtute divinitatis sibi unitae. Unde sicut tactus suus curabat leprosum, in quantum instrumentum divinitatis, sic resurrectio Christi causa est nostrae resurrectionis, non in quantum corporis, sed in quantum resurrectio corporis uniti Verbo vitae." (*In I Thess.*, IV, lect. 2.)

Causality of the Sacraments

In his commentary on the first article of question sixty-two of the third part of the *Summa,* Cajetan makes two important observations.[19] He points out that St. Thomas asks whether the sacraments *are* causes of grace and not whether they are *said* to be causes of grace. The question cannot be answered by calling them causes when in fact they are not proved to be so. Secondly, he calls attention to the fact that in this question St. Thomas is treating of the primary effect, grace, as opposed to the secondary effect, the character, which he treats of in the following question. Thus, when we come to the consideration of the nature of this grace, recourse will not be had to the character as though it were the sacramental "grace" which is a disposition for sanctifying grace.

In the *sed contra* of this article St. Thomas quotes the authority of St. Augustine, using a text which has become classic in sacramental theology: "The water touches the body and cleanses the heart."[20] Since the interior cleansing of the heart can only be accomplished through the grace of Christ, it is apparent that this text of St. Augustine can only be intelligently understood in the light of true physical causality.

There is a threefold division in the body of the article. First, St. Thomas establishes the conclusion that all must attribute some causality to the sacraments. He uses as his major the authority of St. Paul: "For all you who have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ."[21] Since this baptismal incorporation does not take place except through the reception of grace, this sacrament must in some way be the cause of this participation in the divine life.

Secondly, St. Thomas refutes the opinion of those who would reduce this causality to mere occasional causality.

Finally, he gives his own doctrine on sacramental causality. He points out that we must distinguish a twofold efficient cause; he establishes that God is the principal efficient cause of grace; and concludes that the sacraments fulfill the conditions for instrumental causality.

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[18] Cf., *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 12, a. 1 ad. 1.

[19] "Utrum sacramenta sint causa gratiae."

[20] "Aqua corpus tangit et cor abluit." (*In Joann.,* tract. LXXX, super 15: 3 [PL 35, 1840].)

[21] *Gal.* 3:27.

> There is a twofold efficient cause, principal and instrumental. The principal cause works through the power of its own form to which the effect is attributed, as fire heats by its own heat; and in this way nothing can cause grace, except God, because grace is nothing more than a certain participated likeness of the divine nature, according to II Peter, 1:4: "He hath given us most great and precious promises; that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature." But the instrumental cause does not act by the power of its own form but only through the motion whereby it is moved by the principal agent: so that the effect is not likened to the instrument, but to the principal agent: for instance, the couch is not likened to the ax, but is like art which is in the craftsman's mind. And it is in this manner that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace: for they are instituted by God to be employed for the purpose of conferring grace. Hence Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xix): "All these things," namely things pertaining to the sacraments, "are done and pass away, but the power," namely of God, "which works by them remains forever." Now that thing by which someone works is properly termed an instrument. Wherefore it is written (Tit. iii, 5) "He saved us by the laver of regeneration."[22]

As we have pointed out previously, there are those commentators of St. Thomas who try to reconcile this doctrine of causality with the "more probable" opinion of dispositive causality explained by the Angelic Doctor in his commentary on the *Sentences.* They argue that it was not necessary for him to make express mention of the disposition here since it is clear that no instrument can be employed in creation. But as Cajetan points out, such a supernatural disposition would also be the result of creation and hence be unattainable by instruments.[23] Nor is it necessary to resort to a disposition to understand the doctrine of St. Thomas in this article as understood by the term "grace," for he expressly refers to it as that by which we are made members of Christ and participants in the divine nature.[24]

How They Contain Grace

In the third article of this question it is also evident that St. Thomas is speaking of perfect physical causality. Here he establishes that grace is contained in the sacraments in a manner other than a thing signified is contained in a sign, namely, as in a cause, not indeed as in a principal cause, "according to a certain instrumental power, which is transient and incomplete in nature."[25] Such a power can only be attributed to a perfect physical instrument. Thus when the Council of Trent[26] teaches that the sacraments of the New Law contain the grace which they signify, this means that they contain it in a manner other than the sacraments of the Old Law. Nor do they contain grace as a cup contains water, for grace is a spiritual quality and does not occupy space; nor do they contain grace by the formal inherence of accidents, for a permanent and complete spiritual form cannot inhere in a corporeal subject. Therefore it is contained in them virtually, as an effect in a cause, not as in a principal cause, however, but as in an instrumental cause.[27]

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[22] "Duplex est causa agens, principalis et instrumentalis. Principalis quidem operatur per virtutem suae formae, cui assimilatur effectus: sicut ignis suo calore calefacit. Et hoc modo non potest causare gratiam nisi Deus: quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo divinae naturae, secundum illud *II Pet.*, i: *Magna nobis et pretiosa promissa donavit, ut divinae simus consortes naturae.* — Causa vero instrumentalis non agit per virtutem suae formae, sed solum per motum quo movetur a principali agente. Unde effectus non assimilatur instrumento, sed principali agenti: sicut lectus non assimilatur securi, sed arti quae est in mente artificis. Et hoc modo sacramenta novae legis gratiam causant: adhibentur enim ex divina ordinatione ad gratiam in eis causandam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX *contra Faust.: Haec omnia,* scilicet sacramentis, *fiunt et transeunt: virtus tamen,* scillicet Dei, *quae per ista operatur, iugiter manet.* Hoc autem proprie dicitur per quod aliquis operatur. Unde et *Tit.*, iii dicitur: *Salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis.*" (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 1.)

[23] "Nec potest dici secundum (sc. sacramentum attingit aliquam dispositionem praeviam). Tum quia dispositio illa cum sit forma supernaturalis, est aeque creabilis sicut gratia." (*Comm. in Summa Theologiae* [ed. Leonina, vol. XII, *Opera Omnia;* Romae: Typ. Poly. Vat., 1889], III, q. 62, a. 1.)

[24] "Quidquid enim, secundum aliorum opinionem ut probabiliorem, diverit Auctor in *IV Sent.*, hoc in loco, secundum propriam sententiam, longe altius sensit, expresse opens gratiam facientem, qua scilicet homo fit membrum Christi, et quo sumus divinae naturae consortes, a Deo principaliter et a sacramento instrumentaliter effici." *(Ibid.)*

In the fourth article he points out that those who say that the sacraments cause grace concomitantly with the divine power, deny that there is any power in the sacraments themselves which causes grace. Those who say that the sacraments are true instrumental causes must attribute to them an instrumental power to attain the sacramental effect, which power must be proportioned to the instrument.[28] This latter requirement he proves in the following manner:

> Whence (this instrumental power) is compared to the absolute and perfect power of anything as the instrument is compared to the principal agent. For the instrument, as has been said, operates only insofar as it is moved by the principal agent which operates *per se.* And therefore the power of the principal agent has a permanent and complete existence in nature: the instrumental power however has an existence which is passing from one thing to another and is incomplete; just as motion is an imperfect act of the agent on the patient.[29]

As Cajetan points out, not only the adversaries but also the followers of St. Thomas have been inclined to misunderstand the true meaning of this doctrine. They have taken this instrumental power not only as something superadded to the proper form of the instrument but also as something which is superadded to the very motion which the instrument receives from the principal agent. Cajetan argues from the common notion of instruments and from the notion of instrument as applied to the sacraments by St. Thomas, to show that St. Thomas did not intend to require any superadded power to the motion but that this power was the very motion itself. Cajetan concludes:

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[25] "Sed secundum quandam instrumentalem virtutem, quae est fluens et incompleta in esse naturae." (*Summa Theol.,* III, q. 62, a. 3.)

[26] "Si quis dixerit, sacramenta novae Legis *non continere gratiam, quam significant,* aut gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicem non conferre, quasi signa tantum externa sint acceptae per fidem gratiae vel iustitiae, et notae quasdam christianae professionis, quibus apud homines discernuntur fideles ab infidelibus: A.S." (Denz., 849.)

[27] Billuart, *Summa Sancti Thomae* (Lecoffre, Paris: 1904), t. VIII, diss. III, a. 2.

[28] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 62, a. 4.

[29] "Unde comparatur ad virtutem absolutam et perfectam alicuius rei sicut comparatur instrumentum ad agens principale. Instrumentum enim, ut dictum est, non operatur nisi inquantum est motum a principale agente, quod per se operatur. Et ideo virtus principalis agentis habet permanens et completum esse in natura: virtus autem instrumentalis habet esse transiens ex uno in aliud, et incompletum; sicut et motus est actus imperfectus ab agente in patiens." (*Ibid.*)

> For the use or motion by which God moves or uses our sensible action constitutes the sacrament in a state wherein it actually causes sacramental grace: because it is that motion by which it is constituted a mover moved by a principal agent. It is a spiritual power: because it is a *quo* with respect to a spiritual effect. It is the very grace itself according to an incomplete and transient being: because it is a mediation and a certain motion to grace.[30]

This argument is confirmed by the response to the first objection wherein St. Thomas compares this instrumental power to the spiritual power possessed by the sensible voice insofar as it is *used* by the mind to signify something to the mind of the listener.[31]

In the sixth article St. Thomas ascribes to the sacraments of the New Law a causative power which he denies was possessed by the sacraments of the Old Law. It is very plain from his manner of argument that he has reference to a physical instrumentality. If the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace, this would have been either from their own power or from the passion of Christ. It is apparent that they do not cause this grace from their own power, since then the passion of Christ would not have been necessary. Hence their power of causing grace derived from the Passion; yet they were not efficient causes, for efficient causality demands the existence of the cause, and the passion of Christ, the efficient cause of grace, had not yet taken place. Their causality, then, was limited to moral causality, because such causality does not demand the concomitant existence of the cause. Since the sacraments of the New Law cause grace in a more noble manner and more perfect way than did the sacraments of the Old Law, and the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace as a moral cause, we must attribute efficient causality to the sacraments of the New Law.[32]

The adversaries of this theory claim that the real distinction between the sacraments of the Old Law and the New is that the sacraments of the New Law confer grace *ex opere operato,* whereas the sacraments of the Old Law did not. This phrase "*ex opere operato*" may be taken in a twofold sense, i.e., either actively or passively. Our opponents deny that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace actively in this manner, i.e., they confer grace through a physical power transiently communicated to them, beyond the merits and dispositions of the one administering it, and also beyond those of the recipient. They do admit a passive causality *ex opere operato,* insofar as God confers grace when the sacrament is performed. The sacraments of the Old Law, at least Circumcision, possessed this type of passive *ex opere operato* causality. Hence this explanation would not be sufficient to distinguish the causality of the sacraments of the Old and New Law.

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[30] "Usus siquidem, seu motus ille quo Deus movet illam, seu utitur actione nostra sensibili, sacramentum constituit in esse effective gratiae sacramentalis: quia est quo est movens motum a principale agente. Et est vis spiritualis: quia est *quo* respectu effectus spiritualis. Et est ipsa gratia secundum esse incompletum et transiens: quia est mediatio et motio quaedam ad gratiam.' (*Loc. cit.*, a. 4.)

[31] "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus spiritualis non potest esse in re corporea per modum virtutis permanentis et completae, sicut ratio probat. Nihil tamen prohibet in corpore esse virtutem spiritualem instrumentalem: inquantum scilicet corpus potest moveri ab aliqua substantia spirituali ad aliquem effectum spiritualem inducendum; sicut etiam in ipsa voce sensibili est quaedam vis spiritualis ad excitandum intellectum hominis, inquantum procedit a conceptione mentis. Et hoc modo vis spiritualis est in sacramentis, inquantum ordinantur a Deo ad effectum spiritualem." (*Ibid.*)

[32] Billuart, *loc. cit.*

Thus we must conclude with Cajetan that St. Thomas clearly holds for the perfect physical instrumentality in this question. This is confirmed by the fact that he compares the causality of the sacraments to the causality of the humanity of Christ, and, as we have shown, it is the doctrine of St. Thomas that the humanity of Christ exercised a true physical causality.[33]

Theological Foundations

The doctrine of St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* was indeed an innovation when compared to the theories which were proposed during his time. But it ceases to be an innovation when studied in the light of the doctrine of the saints before his time, and whose authority St. Thomas not only respected, but to whose doctrine his own teaching conformed. He was not an innovator for the sake of innovation but ever sought to evolve a doctrine soundly rooted in authority. In few places is this eminent quality of his doctrine so manifest as it is in this question of sacramental causality. In his commentary on the *Sentences* he expounds the theory of dispositive causality because "this seems more in conformity with the doctrine of theologians and the saints."[34] In his rejection of occasional causality, he writes, "But this does not seem to suffice in order to preserve the doctrine of the saints."[35] And in his rejection of this same doctrine in the *Summa* he writes, "According to this (doctrine) therefore the sacraments of the New Law would be nothing more than signs of grace; but the authority of the saints is that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify but cause grace."[36] Thus it was St. Thomas' purpose in proposing the theory of perfect physical causality to explain satisfactorily the doctrine of the saints in this matter. It is for that reason, in imitation of the Angelic Doctor, that a true understanding of the problem must be based on a knowledge of the scriptural and patristic sources and a thorough knowledge of the definitions of the Councils. A restudy of such sources in the light of this doctrine of St. Thomas will show that the Thomistic theory enables them to be understood in their most proper sense without any twisting of the text. Even Cardinal Franzelin was compelled to say that moral causality could not fully and sufficiently explain the words of Christ regarding the efficacy of the Eucharist.[37]

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[33] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 112, a. 1; III, q. 27, a. 5; *De Veritate,* q. 29, a. 4; *Quodlib.,* q. 12, a. 14.

[34] "Et hoc videtur magis theologis et dictis Sanctorum conveniens."

[35] "Sed hoc non videtur sufficere ad salvandum dicta Sanctorum." (*Ibid.*)

[36] "Secundum hoc igitur sacramenta novae legis nihil plus essent quam signa gratiae: sum tamen ex multis Sanctorum auctoritatibus habeatur quod sacramenta novae legis non solum significant, sed causant gratiam." (III, q. 62, a. 1.)

Nor can the decrees of the Councils of Florence and Trent be properly understood except through this type of causality. These Councils teach that the sacraments confer and contain grace;[38] that in them is a *vis* or power;[39] that in the Eucharist the conversion is effected by force of the words;[40] that through ordination the Holy Spirit is given, and that the bishop has the power of ordaining.[41] The argument from the decrees of the Councils is a very cogent one, since the Councils were not interested in theological controversy but in declaring the objective truth of the matter. In choosing terminology which would aptly express this truth, the fact is that they selected words which can be most aptly applied to the system of perfect physical causality. Thus the Fathers and Councils in asserting the true efficacy, simultaneously established the system of perfect physical causality. St. Thomas merely gave a definitive form to this doctrine. Hence our proof for this doctrine does not consist in conforming the teachings of the Church to our solution, as is the case with the defenders of moral causality, but we have only to show how successfully St. Thomas performed the task of conforming his teaching to the "*dictis Sanctorum.*"

As John of St. Thomas points out, the theological reasons for this theory of causality can only be reasons of convenience, since the sacramental causality of grace is dependent upon the will of God.[42] The first of these reasons is that the sacraments of the New Law should possess a type of causality which surpasses that of the sacraments of the Old Law, and which preserves the difference of efficacy between the sacraments of the Old and New Law. The sacraments of the Old Law possessed moral causality, and at least Circumcision conferred grace *ex opere operato passive,* as we have explained above. In order, therefore, that the sacraments of the New Law be essentially distinguished from those of the Old Law, we should attribute to them the power of operating from an intrinsic power so that they may truly be said to contain grace and to confer it. Thus they ought to be physical instruments of grace and to have an effect upon the very entity of grace through a physical power which truly causes the effect. Other reasons of convenience are that we should attribute to the sacraments the same causality with respect to the humanity of Christ as we attribute to the humanity with respect to the Word of God; and that moral causality fails to preserve the sacraments as causes of grace.

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[37] Cited by E. Hugon, *Tractatus Dogmatici* (Lethielleux, Paris: 1927), vol. III, *De Sacramentis in Communi,* q. 3, a. 2; p. 68.

[38] Denz. 695.

[39] Denz. 858.

[40] Denz. 876.

[41] Denz., 964, 967.

[42] *Cursus Theologicus* (Vives, Paris: 1886), t. IX, q. 62, disp. 24, a. 1., n. 551; p. 271.

Objections to Perfect Physical Causality

Many of the objections against this type of causality proceed from a failure to understand the nature of physical instrumentality. This will become apparent as we reply to the objections against the doctrine of St. Thomas.

One of the principal arguments against this theory is that no corporeal instrument can attain to the very entity of grace. The fundament of this objection, of course, is that grace is created. Our opponents base this principle on the authority of St. Thomas himself.[43] Against this objection we reply that grace is not properly speaking the object of creation and that consequently even a corporeal instrument can attain to the very entity of grace.

As St. Thomas points out, creation is a type of becoming. Since the becoming of a thing is ordained to the existence of the thing, only those things which are properly said to exist can be the object of creation.[44] Furthermore, creation is a total becoming, that is the object of the becoming does not depend in existence upon some pre-existing subject. For this reason St. Thomas concludes that in creation, accidents — which are dependent for their being upon the subject in which they inhere — cannot properly be said to be created. The proper object of this becoming which is creation is any subsistent being.

The fact that grace is not a subsistent being but rather an accident inhering in a substance can be deduced from the words of the Council of Trent: "Men ought to be justified by grace and charity, which is poured forth through the Holy Spirit, and inheres in their hearts."[45] Since grace is dependent in being upon the pre-existence of its subject, it cannot properly be the term of creation. Therefore grace does not receive existence by one act of God and union with the soul by another act. If this were the case, it would be a subsistent form similar to the human soul. Consequently by the very act in which it becomes a quality united to the subject, it receives its dependent existence.

To clarify our second conclusion that even a corporeal instrument can in some manner have an effect upon the entity of grace, we must return to the nature of the instrumental power. The power of the agent is communicated to the instrument after the manner of a motion. Thus grace, as an effect, depends upon a divine power and this divine power is communicated to the instrument. The effect which is attained by a divine power is also attained by the power of the instrument. Since the instrument does not act through a proper form communicated to it, but by means of the instrumental *vis* which it possesses *per modum motionis,* the instrument can exercise an action over the effect by the instrumental action, since this power is derived from God who is the principal cause of grace. This is the formal reason why St. Thomas attributes a perfect instrumentality to the sacraments in the production of the very entity of grace, namely, that the instrumental action by which they attain the entity of grace *is the same divine power which attains the entity of grace,* but in the case of the sacraments through a transient motion. The divine power of creation cannot be instrumentally communicated to a corporeal subject because creation produces its term from no pre-existing subject, whereas every created action by reason of its determined nature requires an already existing subject on which to exercise its operation.[46]

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[43] S. Thomas docet instrumentum attingere, gratiae in se; sed objicies primo, loca illa D. Thomae supra relata (I. q. 41, aa. 1 and 2), in quibus aperte dicit non operari instrumentum ipsam gratiam, secundum entitatem suam, sed aliquid praevium ad illam, quam sententiam non apparet D. Thoman alibi retractasse." (*Ibid.*, n. 298; p. 208.)

[44] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 45, a. 4.

[45] "Per Spiritum Sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum qui iustificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret." (Denz. 800.)

As we have pointed out previously, a search of his writings reveals that St. Thomas at least three times expressly denies that grace is created, and in none of his works is there expressly stated the doctrine of the creation of grace as being his own opinion. On the contrary St. Thomas avoids the expression "creation of grace" which was in common usage in his time.[47]

Another strong argument against this doctrine is that no instrumental cause can act beyond its proper object. Therefore a corporeal instrument, such as the sacraments, cannot attain a spiritual effect, which transcends its proper object. This argument is bolstered by the fact that an instrument should dispose the subject for the reception of the effect of the principal agent. As St. Thomas writes, "An instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the principal cause unless it dispositively operates for the effect of the principal agent through something proper to itself."[48]

To this we reply that it is true that no corporeal instrument can act beyond its natural object by its proper power, but it can attain a more noble effect insofar as it is moved by the power of another. Hence we can distinguish a threefold object in an instrument. The first object is the one which is naturally proportionate to it and according to which it can be the principal agent. The second object extends to the natural agent insofar as it is the instrument of a superior natural agent. Finally, insofar as it is moved by an infinite agent, God, there is not required any proportion to the effect attained, but only an obediential potency. Thus the sacraments can attain to grace insofar as they are moved by the divine power of the principal agent who is God.[49]

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[46] *Summa Theol.,* I q. 45, a. 5.

[47] M. Tuyaerts, O.P., *op. cit.,* p. 180.

[48] "Causa secunda instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi inquantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis." (*Ibid.*)

As for the confirmation of this argument, we must point out the meaning of "*dispositive operari.*" For instrumental action it is not required that the instrument act by a proper action distinct from the principal agent or that it have a distinct term, although it is required that the instrument does operate and that the action proceeds from its potency. Nevertheless, the action proceeds by reason of the power of the motion of the principal agent, *according to the disposition and manner of acting of the instrument,*[50] and in this the instrument is said to operate dispositively. Thus the words of St. Thomas should not be interpreted to mean that the instrument must produce some disposition in the object for the reception of the effect of the principal agent.

It is also argued that since the sacraments are corporeal they cannot be the subject of a spiritual power. This argument, too, can be answered by applying the doctrine of instrumental causality. While a complete and permanent spiritual power cannot adhere in a corporeal subject, there is no repugnance to its receiving a transient and incomplete spiritual power. Since the instrumental power is of this nature, there is no incongruity in attributing such an incomplete spiritual power to the sacraments.[51] Furthermore, the instrumental power of the sacraments is not properly said to be spiritual. It is only reductively so insofar as it is reduced to the genus of its principle, which is the complete power of God, the principal agent, or as it is reduced to the genus of its term, which is grace.

Nor can it be argued that since the sacraments do not touch the soul itself that the contact necessary for causality is lacking, even though this argument seems especially cogent with regard to Penance and Matrimony in which the causality is exercised even if the parties are not physically present. It must be granted, of course, that there is not a contact of the supposite but we cannot admit that there is lacking a contact of power.[52] It is true that there must be some immediate contact with the subject of the effect in order that the principal agent reach its term, but it is not necessarily required that it be by the immediacy of a quantitative contact of the instrument. When natural principal causes are not present to the subject of the effect, at least when they are not present under the formal aspect of cause, they require instruments in order that their power be communicated to the subject. In this case it is required that the instrument make contact with the subject of the effect either by a quantitative contact or through some other medium. If all contact is lacking to the instrument the effect will not be attained. The power of God, however, because of His immensity, is intimately present to all things and it is not required that it be rendered present to the subject of the supernatural effect by means of an instrument, nor, consequently, that the instrument of the divine power be present by an immediacy of supposite, but merely of power. The sacraments therefore directly attain the effect by the divine power which they modify, even though a quantitative contact is lacking. With the same distinction, St. Thomas solves a similar difficulty regarding the instrumental causality of the humanity of Christ.[53]

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[49] John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Theol.*, q. 62, d. 24, a. 1, n. 319; p. 213.

[50] *De Potentia,* q. 3, a. 4.

[51] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 4.

[52] "Praesentia corporea, seu indistantia quoad quantitatem, dicitur contactus molis, qui obtinetur inter corpora contigua, id est quorum extrema sunt simul. Praesentia vero spirituum, qui in corpora agunt, dicitur *analogice* contactus, sed contactus virtutis, ad designandum indistantiam virtutis agentis spiritualis in passum corporeum." (F.-X. Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae* [Blot, Paris: 1937], vol. II, *Phil. Nat.*, p. 106.)

Theory of Reviviscence

The opponents of physical causality thought that the common doctrine of reviviscence had given this theory a death blow. This doctrine teaches that when some of the sacraments are received with an obstacle to the reception of grace, although the sacrament may be valid itself, the grace of the sacrament is not received. Grace is produced later when the subject repents, thus removing the obstacle from his soul. The question arises: how can the sacraments produce grace physically when they have ceased to exist? Vasquez alleges that the more sensible among the Thomists admitted that the sacraments do not act as physical causes but that God pours grace into the soul in view of the sacrament already conferred.[54]

As far as the sacraments which imprint a character are concerned, there is little difficulty in explaining how they can revive through physical causality. Since the character physically exists, it can concur in the physical production of grace. This is the express opinion of St. Thomas with regard to Baptism.[55] As regard the sacraments which do not imprint a character, John of St. Thomas teaches that the reviviscence of these sacraments is accomplished by means of a physical effect remaining from the reception of the sacrament, and God uses this effect to cause grace in the soul physically when the obstacle to grace is removed.[56] This physical effect is nothing other than a determination of the will, resulting from the act by which one freely chose to receive the sacrament. It acts in the same manner as a virtual intention which remains in the will from a previous intention to attain the end. Hugon also proposes this solution.[57]

The most recent solution to this problem was offered by Father Marin-Sola, O.P.[58] The satisfactory nature of this solution is attested to by the widespread acceptance it enjoys at present.[59] This theory, which its author claims is merely a perfecting of the doctrine of John of St. Thomas, teaches that every sacrament produces some physical modification in the Baptismal character. In the case of Confirmation and Holy Orders this modification is perpetual and indelible, and hence these sacraments can always revive. In the case of Matrimony and Extreme Unction this modification is temporary, and as long as it remains, this modification can be elevated by God to be the instrument for the physical causality of grace. Since the modification produced by Holy Eucharist and Penance is transient, these sacraments cannot revive. This theory is founded upon the fact that the Baptismal character is a passive physical potency for the reception of the other sacraments and hence through the reception of the other sacraments it is modified as a physical potency through the reception of its proper act.

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[53] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 56, a. 1 ad 3.

[54] Pourrat, *Theology of the Sacraments* (St. Louis: Herder, 1914), p. 191.

[55] *In IV Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, qu. 3.

[56] "Diximus ergo, quod illa virtus relicta a sacramentis, est determinatio passiva subjecti, qua voluntarie se subjicit sacramento, et ab ipso modificatur, talisque susceptio physice manet, et ratione illius physice sacramentum potest causare obice ablato." (*Curs. Theol.*, q. 62, d. 24, a. 1, n. 265; p. 200.)

[57] Hugon, *op cit.*, p. 83.

Other lesser objections to the theory of physical causality offer no serious obstacle to the acceptance of this doctrine and their solution can be found in most Thomistic manuals of dogmatic theology.[60]

One of the principal objections to the theory of St. Thomas has always been the numerous difficulties in understanding it. This fact was also one of the chief reasons for the development of the theory of moral causality,[61] which was first proposed by Melchior Cano. Cano had attended the Council of Trent in the capacity of a theologian, where he had been sent by Charles the Fifth. While he frankly admits that the majority of the theologians at the Council favored the theory of St. Thomas, the numerous subtleties it involved precluded any unanimity among them.[62] Cano himself sought an "intelligible" theory of causality which would explain the doctrine and yet conform to the definitions of Trent. His system of moral causality was easily intelligible; but in seeking a facile solution, he developed a system which failed to conform to the principles which must be applied to any sound solution.

Readiness to accept easy solutions to the intricacies of supernatural realities has almost inevitably led to serious doctrinal errors. The system of perfect physical instrumentality of the sacraments, while demanding a detailed knowledge of instrumental causality, nevertheless is the only solution thus far developed which is in complete harmony with the teachings of Holy Scripture, the Fathers, and the definitions of the Councils.

Reginald Masterson, O.P.

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[58] F. Marin-Sola, "Proponitur nova solutio ad conciliandam causalitatem physicam sacramentorum cum eorum reviviscentia," *Divus Thomas* (Frib.), III (1925), p. 49 sqq.

[59] Cf. authors listed by Doronzo, *Tractatus Dogmaticus* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945), *De Sacramentis in Genere*, p. 211.

[60] Doronzo, *op cit.*, gives an excellent treatment of the Thomistic theory of sacramental causality. Cf. also, Hugon, *op. cit.*

[61] Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae* (ed. 4a, Fribourg, 1914) t. VI, pp. 152-165.

[62] *Relectio de Sacramentis* (Matriti: 1764) p. IV, 1, 2, pp. 425, 434.

THOMISTIC MATHEMATICS

THE GREAT DEVELOPMENTS in the physico-mathematical sciences of the past few years has been instrumental in bringing about a reawakening of interest in the subject of mathematics. It is the purpose of this paper to try to determine the position and the value of mathematics in the Aristotelian-Thomistic system of science.

Although Aristotle never wrote a work devoted entirely to mathematics, the use he made of it in examples throughout his works shows that he was thoroughly familiar with the subject.[1] It is hoped that this paper will help to foster a better appreciation of the scholastic notion of mathematics. It does not claim to be an exhaustive study; on the contrary, it is but a step toward a knowledge of the principles underlying the science of mathematics.

For the benefit of those unfamiliar with the Thomistic concept of science we will begin with some preliminary remarks, treating very briefly of the concept, truth, and the degrees of certitude with which it is held.

For an understanding of the Thomistic theory of mathematics and its position among the sciences some idea of the theory of knowledge proposed by the Aristotelian-Thomistic school must be presented. As regards knowledge itself, in order for an object to be known there must be in some way an identification of the knower and the object of his knowledge. Since this is obviously impossible from the physical point of view, we must look beyond the physical to the immaterial. We know that man's soul is immaterial and possessed of immaterial faculties of intellect and will, the intellect being the knowing faculty. Therefore, since the intellect of man is immaterial, the object in order to be known intellectually must be immaterialized in some way, "for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver."[2] This immaterializing is accomplished by a process known as abstraction, in which the intellect is able to consider an object by leaving behind its material aspect.

The intellectual image resulting from the knowing process is called the concept. The mind has three operations as regards concepts. It may simply acquire a concept of an object, or it may compare two concepts and enunciate their agreement or disagreement, or it may compare two concepts with one and the same third and draw a conclusion as to whether the two are, or are not, in agreement. If this judgment corresponds to the reality considered, then we are said to possess truth. On the other hand if the judgment does not conform to reality the judgment is false.

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[1] Sir Thomas Heath, *Matehmatics in Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 1.

[2] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, (English Dominicans' trans., New York: Benzinger, 1947), I, q. 84, a. 2.

The truth of a proposition may be held with various degrees of certitude, that is, necessarily true, probable, and doubtful. These degrees by which we hold to the truth more or less certainly are the basis for the division of scientific from pre-scientific knowledge. Aristotle, and St. Thomas following him, gave three categories of pre-scientific knowledge: Poetry, in which the mind accepts the truth because of some representation rather than through evidence; Rhetoric, in which the mind is in a state of suspicion ;and Dialectics, in which the mind accepts the truth as probable.[3] These are called pre-scientific because for Aristotle and St. Thomas the only scientific knowledge was certain knowledge through causes.

> We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and no other, and further, that the fact could not be other than it is.[4]

Division of Science

This knowledge through causes, that is scientific knowledge, admits of a twofold distinction as regards the end for which the knowledge is gained. We know that there are certain things that man can make, such as clocks and the like, and that there are other things that he cannot make but can only know, such as trees, grass, and other natural objects. That scientific knowledge which concerns things which we cannot make but only know is called speculative, while the science directed toward the making of a thing is called practical.

> The theoretical, that is speculative science, differs from the practical according to the end: for the end of the speculative is truth, for this is what it tends toward, namely, the knowledge of truth. But the end of the practical is work, because although those working in the practical or operative sciences seek to know the truth as it is in some things, they do not seek it as an ultimate end. They do not consider the cause of truth as it is in itself, but as ordered to an operative end, or as applied to some determined paricular things, and at this particular time.[5]

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[3] "Nam syllogismus dialecticus ex probabilibus est de quo Aristoteles in libro *Topicorum.* Quando vero . . . suspicio . . . ad hos ordinatur *Rhetorica.* Quandoque vero sola existimatio (mens) declinat in aliquam partem contradictionus propter aliquam repraesentationem . . ad hoc ordinatur *Poetica.*" (St. Thomas, *In Post. Analyt.* [ed. Leonina, vol. I, *Opera Omnia;* Rome: Typ. Polyg., 1882], I, lect. I, no. 6.)

[4] Aristotle, *Post. Analyt.* (ed. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*; New York: Random House, 1941), I, ch. 2, 71b, 9-11.

[5] "Theoretica, id est speculativa, differt a practica secundum finem: nam finis speculativae est veritas: hoc enim est quod intendit, scilicet veritatis cognitionem. Sed finis practicae est opus, quia etsi practici, hoc est operativi intendant cognoscere veritatem, quomodo se habeat in aliquibus rebus, non tamen quaerunt eam tamquam ultimum finem. Non enim considerant causam veritatis secundum se et propter se, sed ordinando ad finem operationis, sive applicando ad aliquod determinatum particulare, et ad aliquod determinatum tempus." (St. Thomas, *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio* [Turin: Marietti, 1950], II, lect. 2, n. 290).

Thus a mathematician who knows the truths of function, number, limit, group, or operator has acquired the speculative science of mathematics. When however, he goes a step beyond and sees what he can do with this knowledge, such as computing the courses of ships from astronomical mathematics, or solving a particular radiation problem by the application of Maxwell's equations, he has further added an art to his science.

Art is called by St. Thomas, the reasonable way of making something. In the realm of the sciences only two possess this added perfection of being able to be directed toward a work as well as to the end which is only the knowledge of the truth.

> Hence also among the other sciences logic and mathematics are called arts because they have a value not only as regards theory but by reason of a relation to a certain work which is immediately derived from their very nature, such as to regulate construction, to formulate the syllogism, and to direct speech: or to number, to measure, to compose melodies, and to compute the courses of the stars. But the other sciences have no concrete task to perform but only are valuable as knowledge. . . .[6]

There are two types of arts both of which look toward a work to be done, but differing as to the type of work. The practical arts have to do with work done with the hands, while the liberal arts have to do with a work of the mind. Mathematics belongs to the liberal arts in that its work is one of reason and not of a physical nature. We shall see later the value of mathematics as a liberal art; but for the present let us consider the speculative sciences in order to find the place of mathematics among them.

In order to be an object of the speculative intellect the object must fulfill two requirements, it must be immaterial and immobile. Immateriality is required because of our intellect which is immaterial and can receive only immaterial forms. On the part of the habit of knowledge whereby the intellect is perfected it must be of necessary things. Necessity implies immobility, for anything that is moved in so far as it is of that order is capable of being this type of thing or not.[7] As Aristotle puts it, "The proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something that cannot be other than it is."[8]

We know that mathematical objects such as number and line and the like can be known intellectually and therefore are capable of being immaterialized. They are also immovable in that, as will be shown, they abstract from sensible matter to which motion is properly ascribed. And so, the science which treats of these objects will be speculative.[9]

The speculative sciences will be divided according to the different objects they consider in their degree of abstraction from matter and motion.

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[6] St. Thomas, *The Trinity and the Unicity of the Intellect* (trans. by Sister Rose Brennan, S.H.N., St. Louis: Herder, 1946), q. 5, a. 1 ad 3.

[7] *The Trinity,* q. 5, a. 1.

[8] *Post. Analyt.* I, ch. 2, 71b, 14.

[9] *In Meta.,* VI, lect. 1, n. 1160.

> . . . and indeed not just by any thing in these objects, but in accordance with those things which belong *per se* to their objects as objects. . . . Therefore the speculative sciences ought to be divided according to the differences of the things contemplated in as much as they are the objects of speculation.[10]

It has been shown that these objects must be immobile, that is, separated from matter and motion, or at least from reference to them. This separation or abstraction from matter and motion admits of degrees, each achieving a successively greater degree of immateriality.

In the first degree of abstraction the mind abstracts from the individual matter and considers only matter having sensible qualities in general. The objects of the science of this degree of abstraction are dependent on matter and cannot be understood without sensible matter. They are dependent on matter because they cannot exist or even be defined apart from sensible matter. The science treating of this sort of thing is called physics or natural philosophy.

The second degree of abstraction deals with things which are independent of matter in so far as the knowledge of them goes, but depend on matter for their real existence. The mind leaves behind sensible matter and deals with intelligible matter only. The science of this degree is mathematics, whose objects, such as line and number, do not depend on sensible matter for their definition.

The science which treats of those things which are entirely independent of matter is metaphysics. It is the science of the third degree of abstraction in which the mind leaving behind even intelligible matter arrives at objects which do not need matter either for their definition or for their existence.[11]

Thus we see that in the order of abstraction mathematics holds a middle position between natural philosophy and metaphysics, being more abstract than the former, and less than the latter; and in the material order it deals with that very tenuous matter which we call intelligible. This is our next point of inquiry.

The Objects of Mathematics

In abstraction a form can be abstracted by the intellect from matter if the nature of the essence does not depend on matter, but it cannot be abstracted from the matter on which the very essence depends. Now accidents may be compared to substance as forms to matter, that is, they are added perfections or determinations of the substance. However, they depend on substance in such a way that they are meaningless without it, and so cannot be abstracted from it.[12]

Accidents according to a priority of nature exist in material substance in a certain order. The first among the accidents is quantity, then quality and the other accidents, for the sensible qualities modify a quantified substance.[13] Thus they cannot be understood without their subject which is a quantified substance. On the other hand, quantity, since it exists in substance first and depends on substance alone, can be understood without the sensible qualities. This quantity and the things which follow immediately upon quantity, such as figure and the like, are the intelligible matter mentioned above with which mathematical abstraction is concerned.[14]

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[10] *The Trinity,* q. 5, a. 1.

[11] *The Trinity,* q. 5, a. 1.

[12] *Ibid.,* q. 5, a. 3.

It must be borne in mind however that such a quantified substance does not exist as such in nature, and as separable from the other accidents. This form is abstracted from sensible matter to which it is necessarily connected for its real existence. It is only the mind which considers them as separate.

> But this is manifest, that the science of mathematics treats some things in so far as they are immobile and as they are separate from sensible matter, yet according to their existence they are not immobile or separable. . . . Mathematics considers those things whose definitions do not include sensible matter. And likewise although those things which it considers are not separate, yet it considers them as separate.[15]

Quantity cannot be properly defined through species and difference for it is a supreme genus. Substance and the nine accidents are supreme genera in their own line, and are broken down into species which are distinguished the one from the other by differences which we call specific. Man, for example, is in the general class of animals, but is distinguished from the brutes by the specific difference of rationality. Thus man can be properly defined as a rational animal. As for quantity, there is no general class above it to which a difference could be added to specify it.

Without this composition of genus and difference we can at best only explain the subject. Aristotle explains quantity through the quantified body as ". . . that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts each of which is by nature a *one* and a *this*."[16] He explains the quantum through divisible things, which are so composed of actual parts that they can be divided and still retain the character of the original substance, as a glass of water can be divided in half and then a half again and so forth, each part still being water. This division is into integral parts, not parts as matter and form, or potential parts, nor into subjective parts, the inferiors of a universal.[17] This division into actual parts must not be confused with the breakdown of a chemical compound into its constituent parts, for such parts are only virtually present in the original substance.[18] Actual parts imply that one part is not another, that is, each is distinct and part is placed outside of part. Thus quantity is not to be taken as bulk or weight or the like but as the order of parts of substance.[19]

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[13] "Qualitas autem . . . non est susceptibilis substantia nisi mediante quantitate. . . . "(St. Albert, *Liber de Praedicamentis* [ed. Augusti Borgnet, Vol. 1, *Opera Omnia;* Paris: apud Ludovicum Vives, 1890], II, trac. 3, ch. 1; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 77, a. 2.)

[14] *The Trinity,* q. 5, a. 3; *Summa Theol.*, 1, q. 85, a. 1 ad 2.

[15] "Sed tamen hoc est manifestum, quod scientia mathematica speculatur quaedam inquantum sunt immobilia et inquantum sunt separata a matera sensibili, licet secundum esse non sint immobilia vel separabilia. . . . Mathematica vero considerat ea, quorum definitiones sunt sine materia sensibili. Et ideo, etsi sunt non separata ea quae considerate, tamen considerat ea inquantum sunt separata." (*In Meta.*, VI, lect. 1, n. 1160.)

[16] Aristotle, *Meta.*, V, ch. 13, 1020a 8-10.

Quantity may be analogously divided into transcendental and predicamental. Properly speaking quantity is only dimensive or predicamental, and transcendental or virtual quantity can be called quantity only analogously. From the fact that a thing is, it has virtual quantity as regards its perfection in the order of being. For instance, the virtues may be possessed with various degrees of perfection. A thing may be called more or less perfect in comparison to some standard, but since *more* and *less* are terms properly applied to quantity, some sort of quantity must be supposed by virtues and the like.[20] Virtual quantity may even be predicated by God.[21]

In relation to the totality of quantity mathematics may be considered as transcendental, but since virtual quantity is quantity only analogously, any mathematics dealing with it will be called mathematics only by analogy. The number whereby we number corporeal things and the number whereby we number immaterial forms and the like is not the same kind of number. Number itself is analogous inasmuch as it cannot be predicated universally of diverse orders of being.[22] The study of virtual quantity and its mathematics would be an interesting study, but our concern here is with predicamental quantity and its science.

Predicamental or dimensive quantity consists either in the order of parts which bear a relative position each to the other or of parts which do not. The order of parts which have a relation one to the other we call continuous quantity, instances of which are lines, bodies, planes, and also place and time. The other type of quantity we call discrete, instances of which are number and vocal words.[23]

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[17] ". . . Et tota explicatio reducitur ad hoc, quod definit Aristoteles quantum per divisibile, non in partes physicus, id est materiam et formam, nec in partes potentiales sicut anima dividitur in intellectivum et sensitivum, nec in subjectivas sicut universale dividitur in inferiora, sed in partes integrales et quantitativas, quae ita sunt compositae, ut aqua dividitur in varias partes." (John of St. Thomas, *Ars Logica* [*Cursus Philos.*, Vol. I, Turin: Marietti, 1930], II p. q. XVI, a. 1.)

[18] *In Meta.*, V, lect. 15, n. 977.

[19] *The Trinity*, q. 5, a. 3, ad. 3; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 12, ad 1.

[20] "Est autem duplex quantitas: scilicet dimensiva, quae secundum extensionem consideratur; et virtualis, quae attenditur secundum intensionem." (St. Thomas, *De Veritate* [*Quaest. Disput.*, vol. 1, Turin: Marietti, 1949], q. 19, a. 3.)

[21] St. Thomas, *Super Libros Sentent.* (ed. Mandonnet and Moos, 4 vols., Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-47), I, dist. 19, q. 3, a. 1.

[22] James F. Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), ch. 12, pp. 295-300.

[23] Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 6, 4b, 20-23.

The parts of continuous quantity possess a common boundary; in the case of the line the common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane it is the line; and in the case of solids the boundary is either a plane or a line.[24] Time is called quantity in so far as it is able to be measured, however it is not properly called quantity because it does not have the being of quantity in itself but only from another, that is, as the measure of motion.[25] Time is continuous in the sense that the past and future have a common boundary at the indivisible of time, the present. St. Thomas in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* says that place may likewise be included in the category of quantity in the same manner as time, that is, as measurable but not as having the being of quantity.[26] It is continuous in that it has a common boundary with the body in place, and the body in place has a continuous boundary.

On the other hand, that quantity which does not have a common boundary between parts is called discrete.

> Discreteness involves the separateness or separability of a multitude of continuities, each of which is viewed as a determined continuum and whose amount is measured by adopting some unit as a measure. . . . The ultimate units of discreteness which arise from the measurement of the continuum are numbers of some sort — natural, real, or even groups of numbers as in transfinite consideration — for any of these numbers is but one type of ordering and measuring the indeterminancy of the continuum.[27]

Thus number can be called quantity for it is the measuring or ordering of the parts of substance. It must be discrete because it does not allow of a boundary at which the parts meet.[28] Since speech syllables are measured according to long and short, they fall within the domain of quantity.[29] They are quantity in much the same way as place and time, that is, they admit of measure but do not have the being of quantity. Again they are called discrete because they have no common boundary at which the syllables meet.[30]

The study of quantity is not exclusively the field of the mathematician. Under its several aspects it may be considered by all three of the speculative sciences; in its relation to the mobile body, as a *property of mobile being*, the study belongs to physics; precisely as *being*, and as it is in the category of *accidents* it is treated in metaphysics; it is considered in mathematics only as *measurable.*

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[24] *Ibid.*, 5a, 1-5.

[25] "Sciendum est autem, quod Philosophus in *Praedicamentis* posuit tempus quantitatem per se, . . . quia ibi distinxit species quantitatis secundum diversas rationes mensurae. . . . Et ideo illa, quae non habent esse quantitatis nisi ex alio non ponit hic species quantitatis, sed quantitatis per accidens, ut motus et tempus." (*In Meta.*, V, lect. 15, n. 986.)

[26] "Locus autem ponitur ibi species quantitatis, non hic, quia habet aliam rationem mensurae, sed non aliud esse quantitatis." (*In Meta.*, V, lect. 15, n. 986.)

[27] Edward A. Maziarz, *The Philosophy of Mathematics* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 196.

[28] *Categories*, ch. 6, 4b, 20-22.

[29] "Sonus autem litterae et syllabae sive brevis sit vel longa, mora pronuntiationis mensuratur. Ergo oratio consistens ex his, est quantitas et in genere quantitatis." (St. Albert, *Liber de Praedicamentis*, II, tract. 3, ch. 2.)

[30] *Categories*, ch. 6, 4b 25-30.

This latter consideration of quantity as measurable prescinds from order to actual existence. It is because of this precision that mathematics can demonstrate only through formal causality, and this only in the quantitive order. Its objects are detached from actual being and becoming, and thus from the principle and term of becoming, namely, the efficient and final causes.[31] Because of its abstraction from sensible matter and existence it cannot strictly demonstrate through material cause.

The problem of *good* in mathematics is directly related to this question of causes and existence. Mathematics considered intrinsically in a strictly formal sense can have no goodness precisely because its objects are considered without reference to actual existence. For it is the actuality that a body possesses that gives it its perfection, which in turn makes the object good and desirable.[32]

Considered extrinsically, however, finality and goodness may enter mathematics, as the mathematical being may be an end or a means to an end. As an end it may be desired for the truth it contains, and truth is the good of the intellect. Its instrumental goodness lies in its use in technology and mathematical-physics.[33]

> . . . those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing about the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them; if they do not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in special degree. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also . . .[34]

Beauty most properly can be predicated of mathematics because of its strict demonstration through the formal cause.[35]

In order to get a more complete picture of mathematics it is not sufficient to look only at science in general, the divisions of science, and the subject of the science of the second degree of abstraction. We must go a step further and see how the sciences are related among themselves and how mathematics can be applied to sensible matter.

Relation of Mathematics to Other Sciences

St. Thomas gives two ways in which one science may be contained under another. It may be that the science can be divided and the parts studied separately. The science of the part will be subordinated to the science of the whole. For example, the science of surveying would be subordinated to geometry, for it considers only a part of geometry, the triangle. The second method of subordination is for the higher science to give the formal reason and causes of the subject of the lower science. Thus astronomy is subordinated to mathematics, for the astronomer knows the fact of the movement of the stars, but it is for the mathematician to give the reasoned fact.[36]

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[31] *The Trinity,* q. 5, a. 4 ad 7.

[32] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 5, a. 1; I, q. 5, a. 3 ad 4; *In Meta.,* III, lect. 4, n. 374; *De Ver.* q. 21, a. 2 ad 4.

[33] Bernard I. Mullahy, C.S.C., "Thomism and Mathematical Physics," (unpublished Doctor's thesis, Laval University, 1946), p. 278; St. Albert, *op. cit.,* Vol. 6, XII *Meta,* tract 1, ch. 4, p. 699.

[34] *Meta.,* XIII ch. 3, 1078a 33-1078b 6.

[35] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 5, a. 4 ad 1.

Although all science studies some particular being they are not all subordinated in the first way, that is, as parts of the science of being as such. The sciences, as has been pointed out, are distinguished by their formal objects. They consider being according to a special mode which is different from that according to which being is considered in metaphysics.[37]

> There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attributes of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for example do.[38]

Every science accepts certain principles as a starting point and from them deduces conclusions proper to the science. We must see if there is a science which can inquire into the truths of mathematical axioms and can tell us about the nature of mathematical being and like concepts which the mathematician accepts as a starting point. Aristotle points out the answer in his *Metaphysics.*

> In general one might raise the question as to what kind of science it belongs to investigate the difficulties about the matter of the objects of mathematics. Neither to physics, because the whole inquiry of the physicist is about the things that have in themselves a principle of movement and rest, nor yet to the science which inquires into demonstration and science; for *this* is just the subject which *it* investigates. It remains then that it is the philosophy which we have set before ourselves (metaphysics) which treats of those subjects.[39]

It seems clear that physics, the science of sensible matter, cannot explain the principles of a science that abstracts from the sensible. Likewise logic does not attempt to explain the principles of any of the particular sciences for its subject matter is demonstration and science in general. Mathematics is not the sufficient explanation of itself, for no science can prove its principles from conclusions drawn from those very principles. All of which leaves only metaphysics to investigate the principles of the mathematical science. Thus mathematics is subordinated in metaphysics, not as the part to the whole, but as requiring it to defend its principles.

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[36] *The Trinity,* q. 5, a. 1 ad 5.

[37] ". . . Quia scientia aliae, quae sunt de entibus particularibus, considerant quidem de ente, cum omnia subjecta scientiarum sint entia, non tamen considerant ens secundum quod ens, sed secundum quod est huiusmodi ens, scilicet vel numerus, vel linea, vel ignis vel aliquid huiusmodi." (*In Meta.,* IV, ch. 1, n. 530.)

[38] *Meta.,* IV, ch. 1, 1003a, 21-26.

[39] *Meta.,* XI, ch. 1, 1059b, 15-20.

The Middle Sciences

In our modern scientific age great advances have been made through the application of mathematical principles to physical bodies. We know from common experience that there are some sensible bodies that can be treated both in physics and in mathematics, as for instance, the stars. There is certain subject matter that is the same for some aspects of physics and mathematics.[40] St. Thomas speaks of three orders as regards the natural sciences and mathematics.

> For certain sciences are purely natural. These consider the properties of natural things as such, as physics and agriculture and the like.
>
> Certain sciences are purely mathematical. These determine questions about quantity absolutely as geometry about magnitude and arithmetic about number.
>
> Certain others are sciences midway between the two. These apply the principles of mathematics to natural things, as music and astronomy.[41]

These middle sciences dealing with sensible matter belong to natural science as regards the material in their consideration, but to mathematics as regards their formal element.[42] This type of mixed science cannot be classified either as purely mathematical or as purely physical. Aristotle, recognizing the formal element as the determining factor, was inclined to consider them more under the aspect of mathematics than physics for he calls them ". . . the more physical of the branches of mathematics . . ."[43] St. Thomas, due to a mistranslation of the text of Aristotle which he was using, held that due to their term which is in sensible matter, they incline more to the physical than the mathematical.[44] He corrects this impression in the *Summa Theologiae,* explaining that they are akin to physics only from the material viewpoint, but that since the formal element is of the greatest value they are more akin to mathematics.[45]

> A true medium shares in the nature of both extremes; and these sciences as regards the form come from and depend on mathematics, but as regards the matter they are physical; the words of the learned must be interpreted kindly if at any time they incline too much to either extreme.[46]

Modern middle sciences are most important. It cannot be imagined that the great scientific progress of the last hundred years would have been possible if the physicist had been forced to follow the observation, trial and error method of research. One example will have to suffice where hundreds could be given. In the field of electronics, Maxwell in 1865 demonstrated mathematically that a variable current in a conductor sets up an electromagnetic wave radiating outward from it. It was not till 1888 that Hertz, following Maxwell's lead, first produced experimentally and detected these waves. The ability to detect these waves at a distance suggested the idea of wireless communication, and Marconi in 1896 received the first patent for such a system.[47] In the laboratory of the research engineers hundreds of like cases could be cited in which mathematics directed the line of research.

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[40] *In Physica,* II, lect. 3, n. 1.

[41] *The Trinity,* q. 5, a. 3 ad 6.

[42] *Ibid.,* q. 5, a. 3 ad 7.

[43] *Physica,* II, ch. 2, 194a, 7.

[44] *In Physica,* II, lect. 3, n. 8.

[45] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 9, a. 2 ad 3.

[46] "Verum quia medium utrumque sapit extremum; et scientiae istae ex parte formae ex mathematica veniunt et pendent, ex parte vero materiae physicae sunt: sermones doctorum pie interpretandi sunt si quando ad alium extremum nimis declinat." (Cajetan, *Comm. in Summa Theologiae* [ed. Leonina, vol. VIII *Opera Omnia;* Rome: Typ. Polyg., 1895], II-II, q. 9, a. 2 ad 1.)

From the foregoing discussion we can conclude to a multiple value of mathematics. Its practical value as an instrument in modern technology is known to everyone who has had the opportunity to engage in, or at least observe engineering development work. The slide rule is equally as important to today's technical research program as is the laboratory bench.

In addition to its mere instrumental value, mathematics enters into the very essence of the middle sciences as their formal element. The best known of the middle sciences today is mathematical-physics. The great atomic research program could hardly have been undertaken if it were not for the valid application of mathematical principles to physical matter.

Aristotle's frequent use of a mathematical example is not just accidental. Mathematics in itself as a speculative science is most proportioned to the human mind, and engenders in it the greatest certitude concerning the truth of its conclusions.[48] The student can more readily understand the conclusions of a science through the medium of mathematical examples than through any other type.

Its value as a discipline of the mind springs from the fact that in it the principles of logic are most perfectly applied. In the Greek schools mathematics was studied immediately after logic for this very reason. It was only after the student had grasped mathematics that he progressed to the other sciences.

As a liberal art mathematics has applications in many fields; in navigation to determine the position of a ship or plane by interpreting astronomical data, and to plot its course; in the mixed sciences with their innumerable calculations; in mechanics of all kinds; in short, wherever mathematical calculations are carried out.

We might well agree with the statement attributed to Aristotle, "As sight takes in light from the surrounding air, so does the soul from mathematics."[49]

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[47] R. S. Glasgow, *Principles of Radio Engineering* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936), ch. XIV, p. 413.

[48] *Meta.*, XIII, ch. 3, 1078a, 8-14; *De Caelo*, 111, ch. 7, 306a, 28.

[49] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, (trans. by R. D. Hicks, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), V, ch. 1, v. 17, p. 461.

ST. JEROME

OF ALL THE FATHERS of the Church there are none more versatile than St. Jerome. Born to write, he used and increased this God-given talent in every possible human literary endeavor. St. Jerome was no mere compiler or copyist, but rather, a strong, fresh, vivid, and witty writer, filled with sparkling vitality. Every facet of expression available to mortal pen was easily illumined by his brilliant genius. He was an unparalleled story-teller, a pamphleteer at need, and a tremendous letter writer. He was a great scholar — in Greek, Hebrew, Exegesis, and History. Finally, he had a rare genius for translation. Achievements such as these are rather above average even for a saint and Father of the Church.

Obviously, then, any attempt to limit the life of St. Jerome to a few printed pages would be comparable to restricting the rays of the sun to an obscure hamlet. Truly, he can be compared with the sun, for the brilliancy of his sanctity and the intensity of his scholarship have influenced the lives of men even to our own day. However, due to the exigencies of time and space, the scope of this paper will necessarily be limited to a rather broad outline without, we hope, diminishing too much any of the salient facts in the life of so tremendous a man of God.

Sophronius Eusebius Hieronymus — to use his classical name — was born about the year 347 at the town of Stridon on the border of Dalmatia and Pannonia (near modern Trieste), a more or less barbaric country.[1] It seems almost a truism that the birth of great men often lies hidden beneath the pall of obscurity. Stridon itself was so thoroughly destroyed by the invading Goths about 377 that the exact whereabouts of this little village remains unknown.[2]

Jerome's family was Christian and of that comfortable middle class which in all the cities of the Roman Empire constituted a kind of provincial aristocracy. Jerome received a good education at the local school. At the age of twelve, like most young provincials of talent, he was sent to Rome by his father, where he studied rhetoric under the great grammarian, Aelius Donatus, whom Jerome called his master, even in later years.[3] With such an able teacher he quickly learned some elements of science, music, history, ethics, and mythology; and he was steeped in the classics, such as Virgil, Cicero, Sallust, Horace, Livy, Seneca, Pliny, Quintilian, Fronto, Plautus, Terence, Perseus, and Juvenal.

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[1] F. Cavallera, *Saint Jérôme, Sa Vie et Son Oeuvre* (vol. I, Louvain, 1922).

[2] *Ibid.,* vol. II, pp. 1-63.

[3] Dom Henri Leclercq, *Saint Jérôme* (Em. Warny: Louvain, 1927), ch. II.

With such an imposing array of classic authors to be mastered by the youthful Jerome the modern student would naturally be led to believe that he had no time for much else. But this was definitely not the case. He delighted in games and spectacles and it seems he was not untainted by the immoral practices of the time. Later, in the desert, he was bitterly to repent these years of wild youth and to find their imprint on his imagination, often seeing himself back in Rome "among a band of dancing girls."[4] However, he was finally baptized at the age of eighteen (Baptism of adults was a common practice of the time — to wipe out all the sins of a good part of one's life.) To his normal studies he added a work of real magnitude. Since he was at the center of civilization he resolved never to let pass an opportunity for his cultural betterment. Copying the books himself, he began to build a library that later became one of the most famous in the world. With his years of flaming youth behind him and under the impetus of his powerful baptismal graces, St. Jerome left the culturally perfect and morally corrupt "center of the world" at the age of twenty.

Called to a Higher Life

From Rome he set out for Gaul with his friend, Bonosus. In the town of Treves, which then had one of the best universities in the West, it seems Jerome received the grace of his vocation. It was to this place that the great Athanasius of Alexandria had been banished. This same Athanasius had made known to the West the devotional practices of Egypt and the supernatural virtues of Sts. Anthony and Pachomius, and of the anchorites and cenobites. Influenced by Athanasius, Jerome determined to enter upon the life of an ascetical recluse. He could have begun to live his newly chosen life at Treves, but that would not have suited his personality. Never one for half-hearted measures he would not succumb now. If this way of life began in the desert, to the desert he would go. Leaving Treves, he returned to Stridon where he won over his brother and some friends to living the solitary life.

The little group of men — Bonosus, Niceas, Rufinus (who later was to become Jerome's bitter enemy), Evagrios, and Jerome — lived a life of joyous prayer and ardent study. Jerome later described it as a "*quasi chorus beatorum.*"[5] However, this "choir of the blessed" did not last longer than three years. Some unknown event, referred to by Jerome variously as a "sudden storm" and "a monstrous rending asunder," broke up the fellowship, and Jerome with a few of his closer associates went eastward to Antioch.

The journey was made on foot. And when Jerome reached the gates of Antioch he was at the end of his strength, worn down, broken, and ill. Saved by Evagrios, he lingered with him, putting off his entry into the desert and continuing, between his prayers and fasts, to copy books and read the classics.

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[4] "O quotiens in heremo constitutus . . ., putavi me romanis interesse deliciis; . . . saepe choris intereram puellarum . . ." (Epist. 22, I. 7) Unless otherwise indicated, references to St. Jerome's Letters are drawn from: *Select Letters of St. Jerome* (trans. by F. A. Wright, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1938).

[5] Leclercq, *op. cit.,* p. 19.

Then one night Jerome had a dream.[6] He was brought before the great Judge of the World. The Judge asked, "What are you?" Jerome answered, "Christian." Then the Judge said, "You lie. You are a Ciceronian and not a Christian. Where your treasure is, there is your heart also." Then Jerome was ordered to be beaten. He was in such great distress that he cried out in solemn oath, calling upon the name of God, "Lord, if I ever touch profane books, if I ever read them, I shall have denied Thee." Jerome awoke convinced this was no ordinary dream for he still ached from the beatings.

There have been many discussions concerning this dream. Some have said it was just the over-active imagination of a sick man, etc. Be that as it may, the dream or vision drove Jerome into the desert where he began unconsciously to prepare for the supreme achievement of his life, the translation of the Bible. The adjacent desert of Chalcis was already full of hermits living under the rule of Theodosius, and Jerome soon became one of their number, sleeping in a bare cell, clothed in sackcloth, submitting himself to rigorous penances, and for five years giving all his days to devotional exercises and to the study of the Sacred Scriptures.

When he entered the desert he fully believed he would never abandon it.[7] He was barely twenty-eight and he had broken resolutely with the world. If after his dream he had denied himself the reading of the classics, he made up for it with scriptural and Christian literature, because he brought his now voluminous library with him. Although there were manuscripts of sacred books in abundance there were gaps in other related fields: exegesis, literature, and history. Since he could not transcribe all the manuscripts himself he formed a team of helpers, *alumni,* as he called them.

Although a sea of sand separated him from the world he was already becoming known through his many letters. While increasing his correspondence and adding to his library, he was adding likewise to his equipment for scholarship. Though the Greek of the New Testament was familiar to him, he was unable to read the Old Testament in the original text. With the help of a converted Jew, Jerome began the study of Hebrew. As any student beginning a course in this difficult language, Jerome found it so forbidding that thirty years later he wrote, "When I was young and living alone behind the rampart of the desert I had no strength against the allurements of vice and the heat of nature. In vain did I multiply tasks to break this yoke; my imagination boiled into the fire of sinful thoughts. To conquer it I put myself under the direction of a certain brother, a converted Jew. After the subtlety of

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[6] *Epist.* 22, 1. 30; cf. Cavallera, *op. cit.,* ch. II, p. 29.

[7] *Epist.* 125, 1. 12.

Quintilian, the flowing eloquence of Cicero, the gravity of Fronto, the charms of Pliny, I was learning an alphabet, striving to pronounce words that hissed, panted, and gasped. What pain I bore! What difficulties! How often I despaired! only to begin again in my obstinate wish to learn." His obstinacy was rewarded. After he settled at Bethlehem, thanks to his long and fruitful labor in the Hebrew language, his translation into Latin of the Old Testament became the Vulgate of the Universal Church.

Although we have said that Jerome felt he would never leave the desert, he reckoned without certain realities — the failures of his poor body, the offensives to be launched by the world and the devil, the phantoms wherewith imagination peopled his solitude, the sullen or even brutal hostility of the monks who belonged there, armed against him as against an intruder. After a few years, ill, embittered, disillusioned, he left his desert amidst a storm of mutual abuse.[8]

He returned to Antioch and, at the insistence of the bishop, Paulinus, he reluctantly presented himself to be ordained. With Paulinus he went to Constantinople and attended the Second General Council of the Church. Here he met St. Gregory of Nazianzus, whom he always admired. From this great master he received instructions in the science of biblical exegesis. It was at this time that Jerome made his first translations and tried his hand at exegesis, on the visions of Isaias. This is his first known commentary. During the Council he also made the acquaintance of Gregory of Nyssa. From Constantinople he went to Rome, still in the company of Paulinus, for the Church Council to be held there in 382. For the next three years he lived in that city.

Activities at Rome

If Jerome is vehement in his criticisms of his native country in Stridon —"My country is a slave to ignorance; for God they have their belly, they live from day to day, the richest is the holiest."[9]— what would he say of Rome on this his second visit? Patrician women — *and men* — had courts of slaves and eunuchs who assisted in large numbers at an incredibly elaborate toilet. Artificial colorings of the face, lips, and fingernails; juices and ointments for the enhancing of the eyes' luster — these are the natural outgrowth of a pagan society. Added to all this there was a building up of the hair (sometimes increased with borrowed tresses of another color) into a high structure surmounted by a sort of mitre.

Some of the Roman Christians were not unaffected by these pagan practices. When a kind of silk dress was in vogue depicting scenes of history or mythology, Christian ladies had scriptural scenes woven into theirs. There were even Catholic priests, complains Jerome, who curled their hair, dressed themselves up, and danced attendance on the Patrician families, hoping for legacies. Thank God, at times like these the Supreme Pontiff[10] was strong in virtue.

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[8] *Epist.* 17.

[9] *Epist.* 7, 1. 5.

Due to his reforming inclinations the election of Damasus was bitterly contested. There was even an attempt made on his life. He must have heaved a sigh of relief when he found that Jerome, whose reputation as an ascetic and scholar went before him, was in Rome. Pope Damasus made him his secretary. Jerome soon became his intimate friend, trusted adviser, and helper in reform, constantly consulted on all points of biblical knowledge. More important, he was commissioned by the Pope to write a revised version of the Psalms and the New Testament, thus to put an end to the great variety of texts which were then current. This was a task of pure scholarship and Jerome plunged into it with all the ardor of a soul in love with God, for was it not Jerome who said, "he who is ignorant of the Scriptures is ignorant of Christ"?

It must be remembered that during all the cares and responsibilities which were his lot at this time he never ceased to write letters urging reformation in one's personal life; and he searched out those who felt themselves called to a higher and more secluded life. Amidst the luxury and splendor of Rome he found a few ardent souls, most of them women, who were willing to embrace and follow his ascetic rule. One of his disciples was Paula, the heiress of the great Aemilian family, who brought over her two daughters, Blesilla and Eustochium. Another was the wealthy Marcella, at whose palace on the Aventine master and pupils used to come together for the study of Hebrew, to join in earnest prayer, and to sing psalms. Jerome helped Marcella found a convent. They, in turn, helped him with his scriptural work; most of his letters at this time are bits of advice or answers to questions they had asked him. His relations with women were all of a spiritual nature. During these months Jerome was perhaps as happy as he ever thought it right to be. But the death of his protector, Pope Damasus, unchained against him all the enmities that his rigorous virtues had challenged and his bitter sarcasms provoked. The new Pope, Siricius, regarded him as a dangerous rival (it had been rumored about that Jerome would be the next pope). The Roman mob was enraged against him by the sudden death of Paula's daughter, Blesilla, which was believed to have been caused by her prolonged fastings and penances; and worse, Jerome was accused of improper intimacy with Paula. This was too much, even for Jerome's strength of character. He resolved that he would no longer sing the Lord's song in a strange land, and taking Paula, Eustochium, and a number of other friends with him, he turned once more to the East. After some little delay he settled down at Bethlehem in Judea, where he remained for the last thirty-four years of his earthly existence.

These years in Bethlehem, surely, were the most important of the saint's life. Here he founded a monastery of which he was head, a convent over which Paula presided, a church where both communities chanted the canonical hours, and a hospice to lodge the pilgrims who came from all parts of the world to that holy ground. So great a num-

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[10] Pope Damasus I (366-384).

ber of monks and women sought him out that he was forced to retire to a cave to gain peace and quiet, so necessary for his work. For twelve wonderful years he continued to labor for Christ in the comparative solitude of his cave. But storms arise in the lives of even the meekest of men.

Theological Controversy and Writings

Jerome had always shared the enthusiasm of his contemporaries for the great eastern theologian, Origen. At that time Origen's writings were used by theologians throughout the East. About 394, St. Epiphanius arrived in Jerusalem and soon made it known to all that he questioned the orthodoxy of Origen. Thus began the Origenist Controversy, which was to take up a large part of what have been called "the tribulations of St. Jerome."[11] Fortunately Jerome sided with St. Epiphanius, but his friend of many years and experiences, Rufinus, chose to defend Origen. In reply to Rufinus, who had written with bitter sarcasm of Jerome and his doctrine, he wrote what was undoubtedly the most important writing of the whole controversy, the famous, *Apology Against Rufinus.*[12] Never was his talent employed with such animation and eloquence.

His strength was drawn from the well-spring of his ardent love for tradition and his pride in his reputation for orthodoxy.

However famous this dispute may be, it still contained the personal element of bitterness between two friends. But generally, Jerome remained objective in controversy.

For all his brilliance, Jerome was not an original thinker. His reliance on and unswerving devotion to the traditional teaching of the Church afforded him a most potent weapon against unorthodoxy. From his little cave he roared against the heretics: against Helvidius he made a magnificent defense of the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Virgin and of the preferred excellence of virginity in general.[13] Against Jovinianus he championed continence and at the same time defended the very foundations of Christian morality.[14] He bludgeoned Vigilantius who seemed to think that external works alone were sufficient to lead a good Christian life. Jerome took a firm stand against Pelagianism[15] and this gave rise to renewed relations with St. Augustine.

Before this Pelagian controversy there had been a few letters exchanged between these two great saints. About 394, Augustine wrote to Jerome suggesting that he (Jerome) should concentrate on translations of the Oriental exegetes rather than on that of the Bible.

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[11] Cavallera, *op. cit.,* ch. I, pp. 193-286.

[12] Leclercq, *op. cit.,* ch. XIII.

[13] The *Contra Helvidium* was actually written during Jerome's second visit to Rome. Cf., *Cavallera,* op. cit., pp. 93-100.

[14] *Ibid.,* pp. 151-164.

[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 96-97.

He also criticized Jerome's interpretation of the Antiochean episode of Sts. Peter and Paul.[16] Neither this letter nor two others which immediately followed ever reached Jerome. However, they did fall into the hands of some scoundrels who quoted these letters as being a rebuke and criticism of the irascible scholar. When Augustine became aware of this he hastily wrote another letter explaining his position and made a definite effort to quell the rumble of Jerome's near-bursting anger, for he had heard the rumors of these letters. Jerome made answer to this letter and, because of it, Augustine gave way to the older man's opinion.

At the outbreak of the Pelagian Controversy, it was Augustine again who took the initiative. But this time the two saints were working together against a common enemy. Thus what had begun midst the smoke of anger — Jerome was provoked by the criticisms of the younger Augustine — was concluded in an atmosphere of mutual esteem.[17]

Lodged in the cradle of Christianity, Jerome produced the bulk of his works. Of course, his scriptural translations are of preeminent importance. It is unfortunate that time and space prohibit a complete enumeration of all the works of this scholar of God. All in all there are over twenty commentaries, the work of twenty-nine years of intense application.[18] He commented on the books of the Old Testament, the major and minor prophets, and on the New Testament, including the Epistles of St. Paul. There are also many more works on Scriptural subjects, Church history, controversy, and general history. All this is exclusive of his voluminous correspondence which reached to the farthest corners of the Christian world. Nor does it include the magnificent translation of the Vulgate. This alone would be a full life's work, yet it forms only a small part of Jerome's labors. Few writers in any age or in any country can surpass this massive catalogue of Jerome's works. Among the great Christian authors, St. Augustine comes nearest him, but even he falls far short of Jerome's immense productivity.

Now the years began to take their toll. Jerome was seventy-two, aged by his labors and sufferings. A man who steadily devoted night and day to labor and spent almost no time in eating and social intercourse has, as a scholar, lived almost two men's lives. It is no mistake to see him bowed by the weight of years. He still worked in his cell, thin, almost transparent; his voice grew gradually more feeble, and bit by bit movement became almost impossible without the help of a pulley with which he raised himself on his couch. Sophronius Eusebius Hieronymus died at the age of seventy-two, September 30, 419.[19]

If Father of the Church is synonomous with orthodoxy St. Jerome truly merits this title. His every work breathed forth the constant teaching of the Holy Catholic Church, sometimes as a frigid blast of deep winter, sometimes as a gentle breeze of early summer. Jerome saw tradition as the very bed-rock for judging the worth of any religious work. With his whole soul he knew and desired that the Faith given by Jesus Christ to His Apostles must be kept intact; without it there is nothing. But our words cannot compare to what Jerome himself has to say, "*Scito nobis nihil esse antiquius quam Christi iura servare nec Patrum transferre terminos semperque meminisse romanam fidem, apostolico ore laudatam.*"[20] Surely, the supreme achievement of St. Jerome's magnificent life bears this out.

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[16] F. Cayré, *Manual of Patrology* (trans. by H. Howitt, vol. I, Tournai: Desclée & Co., 1936), p. 578.

[17] *Epist.* 102, 103.

[18] St. Jerome, *Opera Omnia*, P.L., XXII-XXX.

[19] Cavallera, *op. cit.*. ch. II, pp. 56-63.

If Augustine has so greatly influenced the thought of Christendom, it was the voice of Jerome that gave it speech. The great Vulgate had a tremendous effect upon all the developing vernacular languages of Europe, so that even today there is not a sentence we utter which does not have a little of Jerome in it.

Jerome Becker, O.P.

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[20] "I know that there is nothing more important for us than to preserve the rights of Christ and not to transgress the boundaries set by the Fathers, and always to remember the Roman Faith, praised by the mouth of the Apostles." P. Schultes, O.P., *De Ecclesia Catholica* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1925), p. 473.

FOR PARENTS AND COUNTRY

AMID THE MAZE of variety in the universe there is one characteristic common to all created things: their dependence upon other things. Nothing exists for itself alone; each thing fulfills its purpose in relation to something else. Plant life serves animal life, and both lower forms of life serve man, who in turn is made to serve God. The observance of this order demands subordination and subjection. As regards that part of the world beneath man this subjection is a matter of physical law. Man himself, though master within the universe, is by no means self-sufficient. Had he no superiors he would be an odd and lonely creature apart from the harmony we are briefly portraying. However, by reason of his free will, man can and sometimes does reject this order as a sort of tyranny, an insult to his independence, and chooses instead a subjection to lower things. This perhaps is due to confused thinking which has led some to associate subjection with tyranny and degradation. If this were true, we should expect man to rebel. Obviously subjection does indicate the placing of something beneath another, but this is no cause for resentment, provided the inferior is subordinated. It means keeping things in their proper place as established by divine plan. Man then, like all the rest of the universe, attains perfection through a subjection to his superiors. A recognition of this fact paves the way to an accurate understanding of the virtue of piety.

Meaning and Necessity

The meaning of the word "piety" is subject to great variation. According to Webster's first definition it means pity. A quality of being pious is the secondary significance. Piety stems from the Latin word *pius* which denotes dutiful conduct towards the gods, parents, relatives, and country. The average modern uses piety in the secondary sense. He applies it to those who are faithful to religious duties. By a still wider acceptation he refers to works of mercy as works of piety, which usage resembles the primary definition, for pious works are external expressions of pity. St. Thomas adopts Cicero's definition: "Piety is that by which one renders service and diligent cult to his kindred and the well-wishers of his country."[1] Cult is a term of the broadest meaning and includes the notions of reverence, obedience, and gratitude.

The common note in every case is the rendering of something to another, a characteristic of the members of the family of justice. The exact nature of this debt will be determined later. For the immediate present note that the admirable response these terms evoke indicate how much we esteem the acts in question. On the contrary, the mere mention of a runaway son or a traitor fills us with regret. Each has surrendered something necessary for his well-being and perfection, and both they and society suffer.

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[1] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* (English Dominican Father's Translation; New York: Benziger Bros., 1947), II-II, q. 101, a. 1. All *Summa* references are from this edition.

Offspring do possess a natural love for parents, although this alone is woefully inadequate. Such love simply cannot continually offer that reverence and respect necessary for normal family life, not to mention the responsibilities toward needy or evil parents. The same is true for the patriot. Loyalty does not come naturally in the presence of wars or rumors of war, burdensome taxation, or corruption in government circles. Piety, however, does not lie in wait for crises either domestic or national. If we detect its presence only in special circumstances, this is because the smooth, easy graciousness of virtuous action frequently escapes attention. It is the alarming situation in the absence of this virtue that awakens a realization of its importance.

The subject of our consideration is natural piety and not a supernatural virtue or the gift of piety.[2] Piety is said to extend to divine worship because "the cult due to God includes the cult due to parents as a particular."[3] Properly speaking, it is the virtue of religion which disposes man to worship God. It differs from works of mercy in this, that piety performs acts under the aspect of debt, mercy under the aspect of gratuitous assistance.[4]

Objects and Real Definition

Man's acceptance of his place in the universe is accomplished by a recognition of the rights of God, parents, superiors, and fellowmen. Indeed, it is these rights alone that give rise to his obligations as regards each. Not that these are so many competitors clamoring for their due; rather one act may and frequently does fulfill several demands. Yet considered separately man's dependence on each varies and so will his consequent obligations. St. Thomas informs us:

> "Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the benefits received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and country that have given us birth and nourishment."[5]

An age bowed in service to the almighty dollar cannot but regard debts in terms of dollars and cents. Justice is concerned with monetary transactions, but to restrict it to such actions alone is to miss the real beauty of the virtue. It is with a sense of pride and independence that a man smiles upon the remains of a badly-riddled paycheck. He has paid his bills, which is no small accomplishment in our day. In part we share and praise this attitude. Actually no one ever quite reaches the point where he can smugly relax and feel that he is square with the world. There are other debts no less real which can never be fully discharged, debts paid only by a part of one's very self with such coins of tribute as love, honor, or respect. All are debtors, the millionaire as well as the new-born babe, and there is no question of filing bankruptcy. Here the scales of justice swing heavily in man's favor and there is nothing he can do to restore the balance completely.

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[2] The gift of piety is considered in *Cross and Crown,* vol. III, no. 1 (March, 1951).

[3] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 101, a. 1 ad 1.

[4] Cajetan, *Comm. in Summa Theologiae* (ed. Leonina, vol. IX, *Opera Omnia,* Rome: Typ. Poly. Vat., 1889), II-II, q. 101, a. 1 ad 1.

[5] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 101, a. 1.

The excellence of parenthood consists in a participation of the principality and causality of God. The benefactions received from them as secondary principles are life, sustenance, and direction to a goal. On both scores there is established an unending claim to love, honor, and obedience. Parents are often taken for granted, and numerous opportunities for making some return to them pass unrecognized. When their dire necessity demands our assistance there is a new love and appreciation for parents born of sacrifice. Perhaps this is why God so generously shares His causality, lest in the mad rush of life we completely forget Him. Under God parents are proximate secondary causes sharing in a singular way His universal causality. Other agencies influence one's birth and well-being only mediately and indirectly through the parents. Such is the role of the country in which parents obtain their material needs. This influence, though indirect, establishes a claim to principality for it is a principle of nourishment, training, and social life. The matter then, or objects which piety concerns, are parents and country. We call them the material object of the virtue.

The precise aspect under which the material object is regarded is the formal object *quod.* Piety concerns parents and fatherland precisely as secondary principles of life, sustenance, and direction to a goal. Cajetan states that the virtue has many acts and regards many persons, but its principal act is to the secondary principles of our existence. Since man is generated by parents he is indebted to them before wife, country, sons, or relatives. As a secondary act of piety he mentions acts between man and wife, for both have the duty of conserving their respective consanguinity by begetting children.[6]

The essential character of justice consists in rendering another his due according to equality, which debt is a matter of strict justice. Piety is like justice in that it insures the payment of a debt to another, although the notion "another" is not exact: because parent and child are in a certain respect one; the child is from and a part of the parent. It differs from justice because the debt cannot be paid according to strict equality. That piety be established a virtue in its own right it must be further distinguished from the other virtues annexed to justice. Briefly, a distinct virtue is one that regards an object under a special aspect.[7] In the realm of justice this means that wherever there is a special aspect of something due, there is a distinct virtue insuring the payment of that debt. Certainly the indebtedness to parents and country is different from every other debt.

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[6] Cajetan, *loc. cit.*

[7] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 80, art. unic.

A complete enumeration of the virtues deduced according to the above principle will add confirmation and place piety in its proper setting. The virtues annexed to justice have something in common with the principal virtue, yet in some respect fall short of its perfection. We call them its potential parts. A virtue directed toward another may fall short of the perfection of justice in two ways:

> First, by falling short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render the equal due.[8]

In the following relationships there is a strict debt but not an equal repayment. Firstly, man owes God adoration and thanksgiving, and religion disposes man to offer God the worship due Him. Secondly, children cannot make an equal return to parents and country for the benefits received, and thus piety is annexed to justice. Thirdly, we cannot sufficiently repay men of virtue, but we can render them honor and deference. The remaining virtues concern a moral debt, or that which the rectitude of virtue demands. This debt admits of two degrees. *One* is so necessary that without it the decency of virtue is not ensured. Considered from the point of view of the debtor, it obliges man to represent himself to others just as he is (veracity); from the side of the creditor, some recompense is due for benefits received (gratitude), punishment for injuries inflicted (vindication). The *other* has less of the nature of due and is necessary in the sense of leading to greater rectitude of virtue. Social harmony is more easily maintained when man deals with others in a friendly and agreeable manner (affability), or when he distributes money and temporal goods according to the dictates of reason (liberality).

This catalogue of claims is not such as to leave man stripped and broken; on the contrary he is perfected in proportion to the reasonable payment of these debts. This is especially evident in the virtue of religion, for we cannot worship God without perfecting ourselves. The same holds true as you descend the list of debtors; however, the opportunities for perfection are considerably lessened. Yet piety not only participates the nature of religion but also includes formally and eminently the special aspects of indebtedness which distinguish the virtues below it. Consequently the various acts which these lesser virtues offer are eminently included in piety.

The motive for piety, or the formal object *quo,* is the perfection attained by the acts of the virtue. Briefly, it is the equality and tranquility conferred upon the social order. As we have already indicated, failure disrupts the divine plan and invites disorder. Man craves order and peace, and both are impossible unless he recognize the rights of others. Moreover, as a member of society he sees this debt as something due himself, and he sees any refusal to respect the claims of others as a forfeiting of his own rights.

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[8] *Loc. cit.*

Having examined the objects of piety, we will attempt to give the essential definition. "Piety is that moral virtue which inclines one to render parents and government that reverence and service due them as authors and sustainers of our being."

Subject

What is the faculty perfected by this virtue? We do not say a person possesses piety because he knows a thing rightly, and hence the virtue is not in the intellect. Piety is concerned with action and must be located in the root source of all action, namely, in the appetite. The appetites are of two kinds: the rational appetite or will which is in the reason, and the sensitive appetite which follows sense apprehension. The sense appetite is concerned with immediate, particular, and personal goods and cannot desire the good of another. Moreover, it is unable to perceive the relationship between rights and duties. Piety therefore is subjected in the will, since only the will following reason can regard another's good. Although the will does not require a virtue inclining it to a proportionate good, for a good transcending the proportion of the potency virtue is necessary. There are two such goods: one is the divine good to which the will is elevated by charity; the second is the good of another in respect to which justice perfects the will.[9]

Piety in Action

The acts of every virtue are limited by the circumstances. We reverence parents as sharers in divine principality, and consequently obligations to God and parents do not clash. Generally speaking, if homage to parents keeps one from service of God, it ceases to be an act of piety. Should there be an apparent conflict, we must determine which is our primary obligation. This is one of the few cases of excess the virtue must restrain; however, normally it concerns itself with supplying the defect in conduct toward parents. The first and essential duty to parents is reverence, manifest by the marks of respect customarily shown. It is disrespectful to despise them because of poverty, lack of knowledge, or feebleness. Moreover, there is an accidental obligation of support arising from a particular exigency, as sickness or poverty. We should visit them in illness, assist them if they are poor, and make provision for their spiritual needs. However, a married son's first duty is to his own family and then to parents insofar as his income permits.

Parents, even if wicked, still have a claim to reverence and assistance, though not at the expense of our soul. St. Thomas says, "If parents incite us to sin and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them."[10] Nevertheless they are still our parents and we must fulfill our obligations from a distance at which our higher interests may be safeguarded. Cajetan indicates the use of the words 'provoke' and 'induce' in the responses to the first and third objections respectively. If, for instance, a sick father attempts to provoke his daughter caring for him into sin, and she has no fear of being induced, she is not held to abandon her service, although she may abandon him if he persists. Should she foresee she will be induced to sin, she is obliged to leave him.[11]

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[9] St. Thomas, *De Virtutibus in Communi (Quaest. Disp.*, vol. II, Turin: Marietti, 1949), a. 5.

A final question remains concerning the obligation to parents of one either desiring to enter religion or already a professed religious. One in the world may not leave parents who need support and enter religion. To do so "would be to tempt God: since while having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's assistance."[12] In cases of necessity, the professed religious is bound, saving obedience, to make such efforts as are compatible with his state to support his parents.[13] Cajetan adds, in summary, that if the father is in extreme necessity without him, the son is obliged, having sought although not obtained permission, to help his father. The reason is because precepts of the natural and divine law in extreme necessity surpass every vow or bond. This applies not only for one's father but for every man, since a vow cannot impede the works of justice.[14]

Patriotism

Our consideration now turns to that part of piety which in modern terminology is called patriotism. You will notice we speak of filial piety and patriotism as parts of piety. These are not two distinct virtues; rather they are parts of the same virtue. Piety is a distinct virtue by reason of its special object, namely the debt to the secondary principles of our being. However, these principles may be direct and instrumental, proximate and remote, or immediate and mediate. Parents are direct, proximate, and immediate secondary causes; our country is an instrumental, remote, and mediate cause. As instrumental cause it provides the material needs of parents, making it possible to beget children. Fatherland exercises remote causality by conserving the parents in existence and assisting them in becoming proximate causes. Mediately it aids in conserving us by supplying our material needs. In each case there is an exercise of secondary causality and the debt established becomes the obect of piety. St. Thomas concludes,

> "Man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to show respect to one's parents and country."[15]

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[10] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 101, a. 4 ad 1.

[11] Cajetan, *op. cit.*, q. 101, a. 4.

[12] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 101, a. 4 ad 4.

[13] *Loc. cit.*

[14] Cajetan, *op. cit.*, q. 101, a. 4 ad 4.

[15] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 101, a. 1.

Patriotism, as understood by many modern men and as some governments would have it understood, is not patriotism but nationalism. The latter is founded on pride, patriotism on love. Patriotism is a true Christian virtue. It cannot therefore include, as an essential component, vicious hatred; it cannot be founded on lies, it cannot condone wrong nor under some phrase like "exigencies of war" make immorality permissible. Instead of love for homeland, the nationalistic spirit thrives on hatred of foreign countries. Instead of encouraging truth, it becomes the father of lies under the title of propaganda.

This spirit gave rise to the totalitarian states the world has witnessed during the past few decades. In those states where nationalism reached its height, the whole order of things was reversed. The state was considered the one and only cause of man's being, and man existed for the state. There was nothing beyond the state to which he owed allegiance. Parents begot children for one purpose: the glorification of the state. God and religion became enemies of the state.

Obviously nationalism does not always reach the extremes of totalitarianism, yet even in its milder form, it is not patriotism. Under this milder, nationalistic spirit a gallant American, Stephen Decatur, once said, "My country may she always be right, but my country right or wrong." This statement, regardless of the sentiment whence it springs, is wrong. The true patriot will love and defend his country when it is right, but he will also fight any forces which may put his country in the wrong. The patriot does not bow down before the tyrant.

The obligations of patriotism are three-fold. Firstly, we owe our country, in itself and in the person of those constituted in lawful authority, the same kind of respect as our parents and by the same title. For our country is God's instrument in our creation and direction, contributing unceasingly to our physical, intellectual, social, and, in an indirect way, to our religious development. As long as officials of the state hold such positions justly and lawfully, we owe them not only obedience but also respect.

Preferential love is the second duty of patriotism. "The Natural Law," says Leo XIII, "orders us to show a special love and respect to the country in which we were born, so much so that the good citizen does not hesitate to face death for it."[16] Here caution is necessary lest this act of patriotism be confused with nationalism. Although the virtue forbids excessive love for, or rather pride in our fatherland, nevertheless it demands a preferential love. If one of the motives of our love is its claim to principality, then this love falls into the hierarchy of debts.

The young man who leaves a widowed mother requiring his support to enlist in the service is not being patriotic. Despite his willingness to serve and the horror of the appellation "draft-dodger," plus perhaps the lure of the uniform, his obligation to her is primary. In a sense, his two-fold duties merge, and both are fulfilled when he remains home. Needless to say, patriotism includes not only fellow-citizens but also our friendly allies. An adopted citizen should love the place of his birth, but loyalty and obedience are owed the country to which he has transferred allegiance.

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[16] *Acta Apostolicae Sedis,* I, pp. 408-9.

Another duty of the patriot is obedience to legitimate authority. Certainly no man is called patriotic if he acts against the just laws of the land. One of the greatest ways of manifesting love is obedience, for Christ said, "If you love me keep my commandments."[17] Note that we use the words "just laws" and "lawful authority." The state receives authority to govern from God, and provided it does not overstep this authority, the state must be obeyed. Consequently obedience can never be a blind submission to the state as an end in itself; the honor shown the state must always be subordinated to the honor shown God, and in any conflict of allegiance "we ought to obey God rather than men."[18]

Conclusion

The value of piety is best indicated by the position which the command to honor parents occupies in the decalogue. Immediately following the precepts directing us to God is the precept concerning parents, so that this precept has a certain affinity to those of the First Table.[19] While the other moral virtues outside the realm of justice regulate man in himself, piety escapes the personal and regards others. Aristotle considers virtue directed toward another nobler than the regulation of the passions by observing that it is more rare and difficult "for many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations to their neighbor."[20] Finally the present domestic and political conditions reveal that an understanding of and the practice of piety is not infrequently lacking. Many methods of modern child training undermine the very foundation of filial piety, while extreme individualism, in protest against Socialism, is substituted for patriotism. Both are a denial of man's true relationship to his family, his country, and his God.

Augustine Bordenkircher, O.P.
Aquinas Connelly, O.P.

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[17] John 14:15.

[18] Acts 5:29.

[19] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 122, a. 5.

[20] *Nicomachean Ethics* (ed. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle:* New York: Random House, 1941), Bk. V, ch. 1.

PREACHING IN THE EARLY DOMINICAN CONSTITUTIONS

THE MOTTO EMBLAZONED on the shield of the Order of Preachers is *Veritas.* For over seven centuries the Order has remained faithful to this motto, so faithful that it has become known as "the Order of Truth."

St. Dominic founded his Order to again make known the truth to a would overrun by heresy. He was well qualified to do such work, for, as Bede Jarrett mentions, he was a graduate in theology who brought with him into religion the maturity and completeness of learning which he had acquired in the schools.[1] He became the first minister of public education in Europe.

It is not surprising, therefore, that when he dispersed the brethren on August 15, 1217, he dispatched them to the university cities, principally Paris and Bologna. It was the same consideration that urged him to select Matthew of France, a learned man, to be superior of the brethren sent to Paris, and Reginald of Orleans, a professor and Doctor of Law, to be put in charge of the convent at the University of Bologna. Among the first official acts of the Holy Founder as Master General was the formulation of rules designed to promote the educational efficiency of the Order.

The first chapter that St. Dominic convened at Bologna admonished the brethren to attend assidously to books and studies. Other observances were to be relaxed for reasonable causes, but never study. Superiors were empowered to dispense with any article of the Rule that interfered with study. And even the solemn chanting of the Divine Office was to be hastened so as to permit more time for study. Thus, very early in the evolution of the Order the brethren found their way to professorial chairs and were busily engaged in the academic activity of teaching.

Our purpose here is to discover from the early Constitutions the precise aim, the special end of the Order at its foundation. It is an historical fact that some of the most fruitful work of the Order in the thirteenth century was done in the lecture halls. Yet, was the Order instituted for purposes of academic teaching? Before we examine the early Constitutions for an answer to this question, we must first discuss the origin and nature of those Constitutions.

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[1] *Life of St. Dominic* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1947), p. 95.

The nature and origin of the primitive Constitutions, then, as edited by the Dominican scholar, Henry Denifle, will be our first consideration.[2] These constitutions represent the earliest stage of Dominican legislation; they were copied from a manuscript in the convent of Rodez and represent substantially the same constitutions as were in use in the time of Blessed Jordan of Saxony, immediate successor to St. Dominic.

From the date given in the title of Fr. Denifle's edition of the early Constitutions (1228), as well as from the frequent use of this date within the article itself, the erroneous conclusion has been deduced that the primitive Constitutions were the work of the Most General Chapter of 1228. This would mean that the first legislation appeared fully twelve years after the confirmation of the Order, and seven years after the death of its Founder. Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., has devoted an entire chapter to the correction of this error. He comments:

> The mistake of a master historian, in the case of a remarkable study, gave rise to this error. Supplementing the edition of the Rodez text with a long commentary in order to emphasize, with his characteristic erudition, particulars and details of the legislative text about to be given to the public, Fr. Henry Denifle was led to assign to it a more or less approximate date. This chronological note was only of slight import in the work. The question was not approached in a critical manner, and the statement did not have the force which certain later writers ascribed to it in their reports, without pursuing a new investigation.[3]

He goes on to say that from a close investigation of Fr. Denifle's article, it can be shown that he (Denifle) never intended to settle the date definitely. For Fr. Denifle says at the beginning of his article that the Constitutions of 1228 are not the oldest of the Order in the sense that there would not have been others earlier. He quotes Froger de Pena as testifying at the canonization process of St. Dominic that he (Dominic) had a certain regulation introduced into the "Rule of the Preachers" and that similar declarations occur frequently. However, Denifle does mention that before 1228 the Constitutions had no determined order, were still very incomplete, and that even if they had been compiled there were probably very few copies for circulation.

The solemn introduction to the early Constitutions undoubtedly impressed Denifle. It reads:

> In the 1228th year from the Incarnation of Our Lord there assembled at Paris, in the convent of St. James, twelve Fathers Provincial along with Jordan of Saxony, Master of our Order, each with two definitors . . .[4]

Nevertheless, this does not prove that the Constitutions were first written at that time. This quotation merely gives the chapter of 1228 the role of first place, as Mandonnet mentions, thus opening the way to a false interpretation. Hence, when Denifle notes that these capitular fathers inserted a few additions in their respective places among the other articles, we may draw the same conclusion as did Mandonnet; namely, that prior to 1228 the major part of the Constitutions had been committed to writing, and that this Chapter only enriched its text with a few new elements.

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[2] Heinrich Denifle, O.P., "Die Constitutionen des Prediger-Ordens vom Jahre 1228, "*Archiv fur Litteratur-und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* (Berlin: Weidemannsche Buchlandlung, 1885), I, pp. 193-227.

[3] *St. Dominic and His Work* (trans. by Sr. M. B. Larkin, O.P., St. Louis: Herder, 1945), pp. 292-301. All further references to Mandonnet are from these pages.

[4] "Anno ab incarnatione domini mccxxviii convenerunt parisiis in domo sancti jacobi xii priores provinciales, una cum Jordano magistro ordinis nostri, singuli cum duobus diffinitoribus . . ." (Denifle, *op. cit.*, p. 165.)

Their Origin

The question then arises as to how far back we are to trace the origin of these early Constitutions. Our search leads us to canon thirteen of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) which forbade the establishment of a new religious house without first choosing for it both a rule and a constitution from an already approved religious institute.[5] Although Dominic had established a convent at Toulouse before the promulgation of this law, nevertheless it seems that when told to select an approved rule, he and his brethren also decided upon an approved constitution of some canonical institute. Certainly this would facilitate the confirmation of the contemplated religious foundation. Even Blessed Jordan of Saxony mentions the fact that, besides the Rule of St. Augustine, the Preachers (Friars Preachers) imposed upon themselves a certain number of *customs,* which were more rigorous as regards eating, fasting, sleeping, and the wearing of wool.

The word "customs" stands for the early legislation of the Friars Preachers. If any permanence were to be given to such legislation, it must needs be written. Moreover, it was inconceivable that St. Dominic would disperse the brethren a few months later without having written down for them the customs which were to guide their life. In fact, as may be ascertained from Mandonnet in the work we have already quoted, the *customs* may be regarded as a technical term in the legal language of the age. It was employed not in the sense that we ordinarily understand it today, but rather was used to designate a written law.

Accordingly St. Dominic and his brethren drew up the first part of the Constitutions in 1216. Another name for this first part of the Constitutions is "the first distinction," as opposed to "the second distinction" which was drawn up four years later. This first legislation was concerned principally with the practices of conventual life, and was borrowed in large part from the Customs of Prémontré, since these Premonstratensian constitutions lent themselves to easy adaptation for the office of preaching. Dominic, however, made a large number of additions and corrections which transformed the spirit of the Norbertine legislation. The ministry of preaching was to be zealously promoted, and study was to be intense. This first legislation was so basic to the spirit of the Order, that it received only rare additions in all the subsequent general chapters.

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[5] H. Schroeder, O.P., *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils* (St. Louis: Herder, 1937), p. 254.

The second part of the Constitutions, "the second distinction," was drawn up at the first chapter of the brethren in 1220, at which St. Dominic presided. At this chapter the governmental organization of the Order was determined and appended to the already existing customs (Constitutions). From all these facts, then, it is quite evident that St. Dominic himself, and his early companions in the Order, were responsible for drawing up the first Constitutions. Moreover, these Constitutions were to serve as a framework, a foundation, upon which all further legislation in the Order would rest.

Their Relation to Preaching

Our next consideration will be the legislation of these primitive Constitutions with regard to the special work of the Friars, namely preaching. Indeed, one cannot help but be impressed with the many rules for the guidance of brethren engaged in this work.

In the prologue, preaching is mentioned first as the reason for dispensations and secondly as the special end of the Order.

> Nevertheless, the prelate has the power of dispensing the brethren in his convent, when it seems expedient, especially in whatever may hinder study, preaching, or the welfare of souls; since our Order is known to have been instituted from the beginning especially for preaching and the salvation of souls.[6]

The principle of dispensation is thus placed at the very head of Dominic's addition to the constitutions of Prémontré, for he fully realized the frailty of human nature. Surely it would be better to keep the Rule in its entirety, but the Holy Patriarch knew that this was not always possible in view of the apostolic work expected of the brethren. Hence the superior was to dispense the friars from those observances which especially hindered study, preaching, and the salvation of souls. Dispensations were not intended to be a source of laxity, but rather were expected to safeguard the very end of the Order. Pére Jacquain, O.P., comments:

> Here was another novelty: the dispensation, a thing unknown under this form to the older religious rules, but a principle which was to secure a great deal of flexibility, in the management of a complicated organism. And the vitality of the Order was to depend very largely upon the right application of this principle. To ignore it would be to reduce the Dominican ideal to a chaos where one good element would jostle another; to neglect it would be to condemn the Order to stagnation in a very brief space; to exaggerate it would mean speedy decay. Any one of these misconceptions would mutilate the Order and falsify St. Dominic's ideal.[7]

The Constitutions point out explicitly the principal things from which the brethren are to be dispensed, that is, "in whatever may hinder study, preaching, or the welfare of souls." In his classical commentary on the primitive Constitutions, Humbert of Romans, St. Dominic's fourth successor as Master General, states that these three things are ordered one to another; study is ordered to preaching, and preaching in its turn is ordered to the salvation of souls, the ultimate goal of all preaching.[8] Here, then, is a clear testimony to the excellence and importance of this work of preaching to which the friars were dedicated; the Constitutions themselves can be set aside, dispensed from, in order to implement the apostolate of the word.

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[6] "Ad hoc tamen in conventu suo prelatus dispensandi cum fratribus habeat potestatem, cum sibi aliquando videbitur expedire, in his precipue, quae studium, vel predicationem, vel animarum fructum videbuntur impedire, cum ordo noster specialiter ob predicationem et animarum salutem ab initio noscatur institutus fuisse." (Denifle, *op. cit.*, 194 sq.)

[7] *The Friar Preacher Yesterday and Today* (trans. by Hugh Pope, O.P., London: R. & T. Washbourne, 1915), p. 77.

To emphasize this point concerning the excellence of preaching, we can do no better than refer again to Humbert of Romans. He affirms that among goods which are of profit to the soul (namely, knowledge and virtue) there are certain things which only enhance our knowledge and profit little for salvation, such as teaching, argumentation, and secular study; whereas preaching, he says, is an aid to our practice of virtue, without which there is no salvation, because it is directly ordered to encouraging men to virtue. Scripture says that preachers are the "mouth of God." Since no act of man is nobler than that of speech, the mark distinguishing man from brute, then preaching (the act of speech) is a noble office. Since this work of preaching is such an excellent work, Our Lord told his disciple to "let the dead bury their dead" (Matt. 8:22) and to follow Him in order to preach the kingdom of God. Likewise, St. Paul did not baptize lest he be hindered in preaching (I Cor. 1:14), and the Apostles did not wait on table so that they might not relinquish the preaching of God's word. With how much more reason, then, are not human statutes and ordinances to be dispensed from lest they interfere with preaching.[9]

The Constitutions themselves point out the reason why dispensations should be granted for study, preaching, and the care of souls; "since our Order is known to have been instituted from the beginning especially for preaching and the salvation of souls." To explain this, we again have recourse to Humbert of Romans who informs us that if something is instituted for a particular end nothing should militate contrary to that end. Hence, none of the ordinances of the Constitutions should be held so rigidly that they impede the end for which the Order had been specially instituted, namely, for preaching and the salvation of souls. He further notes this twofold end of the Order saying that the former is ordained to the latter, as a proper end is ordained to a common end.

As an illustration of this point, Humbert compares the Order of Preachers with some of the other Orders. He notes that some Orders receive their name from a principal convent as from a head, such as the Cistercian Order, and this acts as a kind of *efficient* cause. Others, such as the Friars Minor, receive their name from the circumstances of their members, as from a kind of *material* cause. There are still others, as the Order of Trinitarians, that draw their name from their manner of life, in that they divide their goods into three parts, such being a kind of *formal* cause. However, the Order of Preachers derives its name from its end, the *final* cause. For it is better that a thing be named from its end than from anything else; just as a foot-rule, though it should be made of gold, made most exactly, and by the very best ruler-maker, nevertheless it is named from its end which is to measure rather than from its material (the gold), its form (the straightness), or its maker.[10]

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[8] *De Vita Regulari* (ed. Berthier, Rome: Typis a Befani, 1889), II, 2.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

Specific Duties of Preachers

The frequent mention of the office of preaching in the Constitutions, as well as the many regulations laid down to guide the conduct of preachers, all point to the importance of this office in the ordinary life of the friars. In the work by Denifle, quoted at the beginning of this article, there are contained many passages of the primitive constitutions dealing with rules for preachers.

Preaching is not to be abused, and it is a light fault for one who is on a preaching mission to engage in idle conversation. It is also a privilege, and as a penalty for certain faults the faculty of preaching shall be taken away. Even the novices are admonished to be fervent in preaching at the opportune times. The visitator, too, is to note whether the brethren be fervent in preaching.

When speaking of those who are suited for the office of preaching, the Constitutions are very exacting. The detailed demands clearly show the importance attached to this office. A whole constitution is devoted to a description of those who are considered suited for preaching. It states that they need not only the mandate of their prior but also must be appointed to the office of preaching by the major prelate or the provincial chapter; they must undergo an intense examination concerning the grace of preaching which God may have given them, their study, religion, fervor, and like things; finally, with the consent of the provincial they may continue their studies and exercise the office of preaching, either with others who are more experienced, or by themselves if their superiors think them capable of it.[11]

One constitution is worth quoting in its entirety, for it will give an insight into the requirements demanded of preachers, their manner of conduct, as well as those who are to accompany them:

> We determine that no one may become a preacher general before he has completed three years of theology; however, those who have finished one year may be admitted to the exercise of preaching, provided that no fear of scandal may arise from their preaching. Those who are fitted for the office, when they go out to preach, shall be given a companion by the prior, so far as he may judge this expedient in view of their manner of life and character. These, having received the blessing and going everywhere like men who wish to attain their own salvation and that of others, shall deport themselves as apostolic men, following in the footsteps of the Savior

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[10] *Loc. cit.*

[11] Denifle, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220.

> by speaking either with God or of God to themselves and to others. They shall avoid the familiarity of any suspicious companionship.
>
> Those who go out to exercise the aforesaid office of preaching, or on other journeys, shall neither carry nor accept gold, silver, money, or gifts, except food, clothing, and necessary vestments and books.
>
> All who are deputed to the office of preaching or study are not to have care or administration of temporal affairs, in order that they may fulfill more easily and in a better way the spiritual ministry entrusted to them; unless perhaps there be no other person to procure the necessities of life—since it occasionally happens that one must be occupied in obtaining the necessaries for the present day.[12]

There are many other regulations for the preachers. They must respect the right of the bishop in the diocese in which they preach and seek his permission to preach, as well as obey him in those things which do not pertain to the Order. They must be prudent in their preaching, taking care lest they scandalize clerics or religious, and they must be at least twenty-five years old to preach outside the convent. On his journeys the preacher should travel with a companion, while in his sermons he may not exort that money be given or collected for a convent or for a certain person.

These excerpts from the primitive Constitutions help to bring out the importance attached to the office of preaching among the early brethren. The legislation was enacted for the sake of the preaching apostolate. Study was zealously encouraged, for study has always been one of the principal means to the fulfillment of St. Dominic's ideal. Added to this were the silence and austerities of the common life plus the choral recitation of the Divine Office. All these means, used correctly, would help in the formation of zealous preachers of God's word.

In summary, the Rule and Constitutions of our Order were formed under the direct inspiration of Our Holy Patriarch himself, changes made by his successors were minor ones which did not change the spirit of the original legislation. Further, apostolic preaching was established as the special end of the Order, as is evident from the legislation devoted to it in the primitive Constitutions. This, too, is fully in accord with the spirit of St. Dominic, for he was first and foremost a preacher of the word of God and exorted his sons to follow in his footsteps.

Nicholas Ashenbrener, O.P.

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[12] "Statuimus, ut nullus fiat predicator generalis antequam theologiam audierit per tres annos; ad exercitium vero predicationis, postquam per annum audierit, possunt admitti, qui tales sunt, de quorum predicatione scandalum non timetur. Et hi qui apti sunt, cum in predicatione exire debuerint, eis socii dabuntur a priore, secundum quod moribus eorum et honestati iudicaverit expedire. Qui recepta benedictione exeuntes ubique tanquam viri, qui suam et aliorum salutem procurare desiderant, honeste et religiose se habeant sicut vir evangelici sui sequentes vestigia salvatoris, cum deo vel de deo secum vel proximis loquendo; vitabunt suspitiosi comitatus familiaritatem.

Euntes vero ad iam dictum predicationis officium exercendum vel alias itinerantes aurum, argentum, pecuniam et munera, excepto victu et vestitu et necessariis indumentis et libris, nec accipient nec portabunt.

Omnes qui ad officium predicationis vel studium sunt deputati, nullam habeant curam seu administrationem temporalium, ut expedicius et melius iniunctum ministerium sibi spiritualium valeant adimplere, nisi forte non sit aliquis alius, qui necessaria procuret, cum in necessitatibus diei presentis oporteat aliquando occupari." (*Ibid.*, p. 223.)

THE MYSTERY OF CHRIST'S AGONY

THE FIRST SORROWFUL MYSTERY of the Rosary is Christ's agony in the garden of Gethsemani. This will be our consideration here. Before we proceed, however, let us briefly look at what a mystery of the Rosary is, in order to fix in our minds the purpose of our quest.

A mystery, in the strictest sense of the word, is a truth hidden in God, which could in no way be known to man unless it were divinely revealed, and which remains obscure even after its revelation. Such truths are called mysteries of faith, and among them we number the fifteen mysteries of the Rosary. Consequently, we cannot expect to pierce to the inner meaning of these mysteries in the same way that an X-ray pierces the flesh of a man to show his skeleton. Instead, we can endeavor to limit the mystery, and to see more precisely that which constitutes the mystery. We can also compare these divine mysteries to natural things in order to explain the precise point in which the mystery consists. A case in point is St. Patrick's use of the shamrock to exemplify the mystery of the Blessed Three-in-One, the Trinity.

Because everyone tends to forget things, it is sometimes useful to consider again the facts surrounding each mystery, for clarity and understanding come with repetition. Here we propose to look at the first sorrowful mystery. The obvious question that springs to our mind is, "How can God, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, experience suffering?" The answer, of course, is that he was not only God, but man. This answer is easy, and could be given by any kindergarten Catholic, but we are not satisfied with the bare bones of the answer. We like to know the details, to ponder over the facts, to compare these divine mysteries with things we are familiar with in order to see them more clearly. Look at the agony of Christ in the garden.

The Beginning[1]

This agony in the garden of Gethsemani was the beginning of Christ's passion. After the first celebration of the Eucharist, Jesus and his band of faithful apostles wended their way through the sleeping streets of Jerusalem, past the south side of the Temple, which loomed massive above them in the moonlight, and down into the valley of the Cedron. He had already given them that sublime priestly discourse recorded in the seventeenth chapter of John's gospel, and now he was possibly still talking to them of his divine role as Savior and Redeemer as they crossed the small, dark stream at the bottom of the valley, and mounted to the garden a short distance away.

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[1] Much of the material in this article has been gathered from three excellent books on the life of Christ: M.-J. Lagrange, O.P., *The Gospel of Jesus Christ* (Vol. II, trans. by English Dominicans, Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1938), pp. 230-233; G. Ricciotti, *The Life of Christ* (Trans. by A. Zizzamia, Milwaukee: Bruce, 1948), pp. 586-590; F. Prat, S.J., *Jesus Christ* (Vol. II, trans. by J. Heenan, S.J., Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951), pp. 313-321.

This garden of Gethsemani was situated on the slope of the Mount of Olives, and itself contained many olive trees. Nearby was an olive press, whence the Hebrew name for the spot: oil-press. It was a favorite rendezvous for Jesus, and the apostles. Possibly it was owned by a friend and disciple of Jesus, and some have gone so far as to aver it was that mysterious young man — tradition names him as Mark — who later in the story fled away naked at the approach of the soldiers. It was a secluded place, quiet, ideal for prayer and communion with God, so that Jesus often repaired there with his apostles to spend hours of prayer and quiet talk.

Tonight, however, was different. Between ten o'clock and midnight, Jesus arrived there with his disciples, and he said to them, "Sit down here, while I go over yonder and pray."[2] Then taking Peter, James and John with him, the same three who had been privileged to view the Transfiguration, he withdrew a distance from the others. Immediately he began to be saddened and exceedingly troubled, saying to them, "My soul is sad even unto death. Wait here and watch with me."[3] And Luke adds the words, "Pray that you enter not into temptation."[4]

In his sorrow and sadness, Christ sought the solace of his chosen three. Misery loves company, and Christ would have been less than human did he not seek some comfort from his friends in his sadness. Since he was human in a perfect way, he asked his closest apostles to keep a special watch with him. He exhorted them to join with him in the spiritual union of prayer to his heavenly Father. "Pray that you enter not into temptation."

Here begins the mystery of the Agony. At the very inception of his public life, Christ had allowed himself to be tempted by the devil, after which temptation the devil left him "for a time."[5] Now the devil's hour had returned, and Our Lord voluntarily entered into his combat with the powers of evil. As an easy comparison, consider Christ as the Divine Penitent who (though he could never sin) performs the three acts of a repentant sinner — contrition, confession, satisfaction for sin. These three acts distinguish three aspects of Christ's agony.

Contrition

The first act of a penitent is contrition, sorrow for sin. Christ's soul was sad unto death, sad with the oppressive weight of the sins of men and with the foreknowledge of his approaching Passion. Christ, up to now so completely master of himself in all the situations narrated in the gospel story, was troubled with a heavy sadness. Gone was his wonted calm, and he was grieved exceedingly. This grief was voluntary, for Jesus always had perfect dominion over his will and passions, and the wounds of human nature, malice of will and insubordination of the passions — the effects of original sin — never touched his human soul. Just as on the cross he voluntarily commended his spirit into the hands of his heavenly Father, so here he voluntarily entered upon the first stage of his Passion. "My life no man takes from me, but I lay it down of myself."[6]

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[2] Matt. 26:36.

[3] Matt. 26-38.

[4] 22:41.

[5] Luke 4:13.

That it was an overpowering sadness cannot be doubted. It was a sadness "unto death." Consider that Christ was foreseen long before his birth as a man of sorrows.

> Despised, and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows, and acquainted with infirmity; and his look was as it were hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed him not. Surely he hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows: and we have thought him as it were a leper, and as one struck by God and afflicted.[7]

He was sent to suffer for sin in his whole human nature; as Isaias says in the same place, "He was wounded for our iniquities, he was bruised for our sins." Since man is composed of both body and soul it was fitting that Our Savior should suffer not only bodily pains, but also anguish of soul, and this most intensely.

The very name of the mystery connotes this by the word 'agony.' It derived originally from the Greek word 'agon,' denoting the struggle between charioteers or athletes who competed for a prize. This struggle demanded a painful and exhausting effort in mind and limb, so that no one approached it without an inward trepidation and fear. Later it came to mean fear and trepidation in general, and finally signified the death struggle. Here was the beginning of Christ's death agony.

This great sadness sprang from three causes: first, the sins of all men, past, present, and future; second, the fall of the Jews and of all others who sinned in his death, especially the flight of the apostles, who were scandalized at his Passion; third, the loss of his bodily life, and the sufferings which would precede it.[8]

Sin caused the sorrow of the Divine Penitent, and in this he resembled his human brothers. Yet he sorrowed not over his own personal sins, but over the sin of others; and in this he differed from human penitents. Consider who Christ is — the Divine Word, uniting the divine and human natures in his single person. Then consider what sin is — man averting his will from God's will, and in equivalent terms saying to God, "I hate you." In comparing the two, we see that Christ detested sin because he fully appreciated its horror and ugliness. Sin was utterly hateful to him because sin meant disobedience to God the Father, and Christ came to do nothing other than his Father's will: "I always do the will of my Father," "My meat is to do the will of him who sent me."[9] Jesus, from his human nature in perfect union with his divine nature, *must* feel sadness and sorrow over sin.

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[6] John 10:18.

[7] Isa. 53:3-4.

[8] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae,* III, q. 46, a. 6.

Yet the immaculate lamb who was without spot or stain of sin of his own had all men's sins present to his soul at this moment. He was even "made sin for us."[10] Through the messianic words of Psalm Twenty-one Christ says, "Thou art far from the pleadings and the words of my cry," which according to the Douay Version can mean, "The sins of the world, which I have taken upon myself, cry out against me, and are the cause of all my sufferings." Because he was true man, he could bear the evil consequences of human acts, even though these sinful acts were not his personal ones; because of his unbounded love for his brothers, each and every man, he felt a great sadness, spiritual as well as sensible, at the evil oppressing them. Sadness is always caused by an evil present to the soul. Present to Christ's soul was the terrible load of all sins committed in the past, from the fall of Adam, through the milleniums of pagan idolatry and devil worship, down to the hypocrisy of the Pharisees. All present sins were there, including the kiss of Judas. All future sins passed in review, right down to the latest sensational murder or indecent show; and the sins of *each one of us* were there, too.

In the second place, a special cause of his sorrow was the fall of the Jews, the Chosen People of God. Jesus himself was a Jew, his first followers were Jews, and he possessed a natural love for his nation. Yet those very Jews were to call down his blood upon themselves and upon their children, with the result that God rejected them and, luckily for us, brought in strangers from the four corners of the earth to take their places. Even the apostles would desert him, and the foreknowledge of this was a deep sorrow to him. They were his specially chosen ones upon whom he had lavished his love and years of training, still they would flee during his time of trial.

Lastly, Christ felt a physical and wholly natural fear at the prospect of his own coming death, when his soul and body would be separated. Note that it was not despair, a hopeless surrender in the face of his imminent Passion. Our Lord was complete master of himself at all times and had entered upon all this suffering voluntarily. Remember, however, that he was a perfect man, and the perfect man does not destroy his passions. Instead he controls them, showing joy, sorrow, desire, or fear at appropriate times and in fitting circumstances. It is natural for every man to fear death, for death is the cleavage of the natural union of body and soul, and consequently it is a proof of Christ's true humanity that he felt dread at his approaching crucifixion: ". . . the corporal life of Christ was of such great dignity and price (by reason of the conjoined divinity) that even a momentary loss of it would be a cause of greater grief than the loss of another man's life for any length of time."[11]

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[9] John 6:38, and 4:34.

[10] 2 Cor. 5:21.

Yet the very *fact* that Christ could experience not only a physical fear and sorrow, but also a true spiritual fear and sorrow is a mystery to us, *because his human soul always enjoyed the beatific vision, even during his Passion.*[12] In his one person, Christ so united divine and human nature that his human nature constantly participated in the face-to-face vision of the Godhead. The immediate effect of this vision was the flooding of his human mind and heart with the perfect knowledge and love of God, perfect happiness; ordinarily, this beautitude would overflow into his human body to spiritualize it also. However, during Jesus' life on earth, by a miracle of grace, his body remained a normal human body in every sense that we use that term; by another miracle, his beatific vision was restricted to the highest part of his soul *(ratio superior)* during his Passion. Christ willed that the lower part of his soul, the sensible appetites and the lower reason *(ratio inferior),*[13] be free to suffer all the pain that its nature could endure, without any overflowing of consolation from the higher part of his soul. This means that no particle of joy from the beatific vision was permitted to enter the lower part of Christ's soul so as to alleviate the pain that he suffered there. Nevertheless, Our Lord's higher nature always ruled his lower. Though his imagination and memory were filled with the haunting, loathsome vision of man's sins, and though his intellect and will, considering things from a merely human point of view, shrank from the dreadful sufferings he was about to undergo, Our Lord's higher reason was constantly in command; he voluntarily submitted his body and soul to the awful trial.

Sorrow for sin is the first act of every penitent. This sorrow the Divine Penitent possessed in good measure, pressed down, shaken together, and running over. Cardinal Newman sums it up very well in his sermon, "The Mental Sufferings of Our Lord in His Passion":

> There then in that most awful hour, knelt the Savior of the world, putting off the defenses of his divinity, dismissing his reluctant angels, who in myriads were ready at his call, and opening his arms, baring his breast, sinless as he was, to the assault of the foe — of a foe whose breath was a pestilence, and whose embrace was an agony. There he knelt, motionless and still, while the vile and horrible fiend clad his spirit in a robe steeped in all that is hateful and heinous in human crime, which clung close round his heart, and filled his conscience, and found its way into every sense and pore of his mind, and spread over him a moral leprosy, till he almost felt himself to be that which he never could be, and which his foe would fain have made him.[14]

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[11] Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P., *The Dereliction of Christ on the Cross* (Washington, D. C., 1940), p. 89.

[12] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 46, a. 8.

[13] The term 'inferior faculties' or 'the inferior part of the soul' seems to mean, for St. Thomas, not only the sensitive parts of the soul . . . but also the spiritual faculty of the reason itself. (Murphy, *op. cit.,* p. 91)

[14] *Newman Treasury* (C. F. Harrold, editor; New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1945), p. 204.

Confession

In his sorrow, Our Lord withdrew a little from Peter and the others, "about a stone's throw" says Luke, meaning a distance probably of some ten or twenty yards. However, he was still plainly visible to them in the bright moonlight and they could even hear him as he spoke to his Father.

Christ knelt down and began to pray, according to Luke. This was a sign of his intense fervor, for the Jews usually prayed standing — as in the parable of the pharisee and the publican.[15] But Matthew adds the note that he fell prostrate,[16] indicating the intensity of his prayer. Christ probably knelt at first, and then as time passed and the full weight of his agony came upon him, fell to the ground.

Here the Divine Penitent confesses to his heavenly Father: "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not as I will, but as thou willest."[17] His cup is his portion, set before him by his Father — just as the father of a family sets before each of his children a portion of food and drink which must be consumed. Christ confesses his burden of our sins, the sorrow which it brings him, and also confesses his fear of the suffering which he is about to endure. Yet his will is always conformed to that of his Father.

Christ's human will, however, can be considered under several aspects. St. Thomas distinguishes two faculties, the sensual appetite (the will of sensuality), and the spiritual will.[18] This latter has two aspects. It may be considered in its absolute sense *(ut natura)* as an intellectual appetite which seeks what is good in itself for man's nature and shrinks from the contrary evil. In this way, every man's will, including Christ's, flees death and suffering as repugnant to man's very nature. Or it may be considered in conjunction with reason *(ut ratio)*, as in the case of an invalid who fears the pain of an operation but is willing to undergo it in order to regain his health.

The foregoing is important because it prepares the answer for a difficult question St. Thomas asks: Whether Christ's human will could ever will anything other than what God willed? Christ permitted the powers of his soul to suffer that which was proper and natural to them. His body suffered cold and hunger, he shed tears over the death of his friend Lazarus, his soul rejoiced at the success of his disciples' first preaching. For this reason, his sensual appetite and his spiritual will *(ut natura)* would naturally flee from suffering and death. Yet, in Christ, these faculties were under the dominion of his rational spiritual will *(ut ratio)*, by which we mean that his will operated in conjunction with his intellect and ordered the proper means to the attainment of a higher end. Christ's rational will ordered the evil of his passion and death to the end of man's redemption. In this manner, Christ's human will was always perfectly in accord with the divine will of his Father who from all eternity had ordained man's redemption from sin. "Not as I will, but as thou willest."

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[15] Luke 18:10, sq.

[16] Matt. 26:39.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 18, a. 5.

Three times he repeats this agonizing confession to his Father. There were three causes of Christ's great sadness, so here Christ prays three times. He confesses his great trial to his Father — the fact that he repeats it is a proof of its magnitude — and repeatedly subjects his will to that of his Father. Although it is instinctively repugnant to his human nature to endure such a trial, nevertheless, he has not come to do his own human will in the matter, but the will of Him Who sent him.[19]

Satisfaction

The third act of a penitent is satisfaction, penance for his sin. The Divine Penitent satisfied for the sins of all men, for they were all thrust upon him. Penance denotes the doing of something that is difficult, repugnant to human nature. It is already evident from his actions that Christ's mental suffering is most repugnant to his human nature — it was the foretaste of all that exterior suffering he was shortly to endure in his Passion. Nevertheless, we have two further signs of it. The first is the appearance of an angel from heaven, and the other is the bloody sweat.

"And there appeared to him an angel from heaven to strengthen him."[20] Why the angel? The angel could not tell him anything that he did not already know, for Jesus had all infused knowledge, as well as all divine knowledge; nor did the angel come to tell him that he would not have to undergo his passion and death. However, Christ *was* a man, and men like company in their misery. The apostles were drowsing, neglectful of his injunction to pray, but here was an angel to tell him of the great good his Passion would do, of the many saints who would spring up to follow his bloody footprints. In short, the angel consoled and strengthened him by his presence and by his words of comfort.

Now Luke adds a detail that helps us to understand the greatness of his agony, though its explanation is still a mystery. "And falling into an agony, he prayed the longer. And his sweat became like drops of blood running down upon the ground."[21] Here was an exterior sign of Christ's interior anguish, which some early Christian manuscripts deleted for fear that it might scandalize many of the first Roman converts, in particular those from Stoicism. This latter religion had many adherents in pagan Rome, for it glorified the virtue of fortitude and thought that any manifestation of passion, such as fear, sorrow, desire, joy, was cowardly weakness. Consequently, from their point of view it was unthinkable that Christ could have been divine and still have experienced such an intense anguish of soul that it overflowed into his body in the form of a bloody sweat. Certainly, they said, Christ was divine and he was human, but the perfect man could never be so weak as to suffer such a bodily passion.

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[19] *Ibid.*, q. 21, a. 2.

[20] Luke 22:43.

[21] Luke 22:44.

Yet this is the opposite of the truth. Precisely because he was a perfect man did Our Lord will to suffer such anguish. By a deliberate act of his will he refrained from mitigating the sorrow caused in his body and in his soul by the thought of his impending sufferings and death. A similar case would be the refusal of an anesthetic by a man on an operating table in order that he might feel the more pain. Christ willed to suffer in his body as well as in soul not because he was weak, but because he was strong. He willed to take on more suffering, all the suffering that it was possible for him to bear, for that was part of the cup that his heavenly Father had given him. As a penitent seeks to satisfy for the sins he has committed by performing his entire penance, so Christ sought to satisfy for *all* the sins of men by his expiatory sufferings. As a result, he wished to make his sensible and spiritual sufferings as intense as possible; to accomplish this he refused to mitigate, through any consideration of his beatific vision, the fear caused in his human heart by the prospect of his imminent Passion.

Does this fear show that the King of Martyrs was less brave than many of his followers? Some of the greatest martyrs faced torture and death with never a sign of fear. Nevertheless, it was natural for their human nature to feel fear. If they faced death bravely and even joyfully it was only because their very human fear was swallowed up and drowned by the grace of Christ, which so filled their minds and hearts that it overflowed into their limbs and fortified them in their hour of greatest trial. Such was a St. Lawrence who could request his torturers to turn him over because he was already well roasted on one side. Cast in the same mold was St. Polycarp who, though he was an old man, stood bravely at the stake without ropes to bind him while the flames leaped up and devoured him. Do not these examples point up the very greatness of Christ? Unlike the martyrs whose sufferings were mitigated by the consolation of grace flooding their minds and hearts, Our Savior willed to withhold any consolation or overflow of joy from his superior reason into his inferior reason and sensible soul in order to suffer more intensely and deeply. As a further consideration, he willed to show fear as an example to following generations that human frailty must put all its trust in God, "Not as I will, but as Thou willest."

The first phase of Christ's suffering had passed, and, strengthened by prayer, he returned to the sleepy apostles. Three times he had admonished them to pray lest they enter into temptation. Yet three times they were overcome with sleep, though not so overcome that they were unable to notice the angel and the bloody sweat, nor to hear his anguished prayer to his heavenly Father. The apostles were ashamed of themselves, "and they knew not what to answer him." Perhaps a partial explanation of their drowsiness was the fact that they were sad, for heavy sadness has a benumbing effect which often induces sleep. But now it was time to go. The hour had struck. Jesus used a bit of gentle irony with his friends. "Sleep on now and take your rest: it is enough; the hour has come."[22] It is as though he wished to say, "Look at you sleeping there, while my betrayer is already upon us." The apostles roused themselves from their lethargy, and all went down to the cave where the other eight awaited them. Now Jesus calmly accepted the fulfillment of his Passion, as he and the apostles heard the tramp of the cohort, and the clamor of voices, and saw the red gleam of the torches through the trees.

Austin Green, O.P.

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[22] Mark 14:41.

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